THE SCHOOL REVIEW

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The Southern Struggle and American Rights

Men acting in desperation to escape a frightening thing may endanger all around them. Governments acting in desperation to escape a frightening thing may well destroy the human rights they were created to protect and to serve.

This peril faces us today as the states of the South struggle to escape the effects of the school desegregation decision of the United States Supreme Court. The struggles, prompted by a panicky determination to keep unchanged the fabric of social and economic traditions, may well unravel the intricately interwoven threads of traditional American rights.

It is easy to understand, and in a measure to sympathize with, a section of the country that is seeing its historic way of life changed by a decision it did not make. Segregation has been a custom for so long that the practice has become a basic value of the Southern way

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of life. Yet it is necessary to be aware that, in the compulsion to pre-
serve this way of life against the law of the land, steps are being taken
that can set the pattern for the governmental destruction of human
rights, whenever such action seems expedient for the purposes of gov-
ernment. Even though this voiding of rights may in some localities
have the consent of the majority of the citizens, the danger is none
the less real. It is a reversal of the traditional American theory of gov-
ernment for the state, in peacetime, to curtail, rather than to protect
and serve, the rights of the people.

The specter that haunted the South had been forming for many
months. Then on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that "racial discrimination in public education is uncon-
stitutional. All provisions of federal, state, or local laws requiring or
permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle" (1). This
decision brought into focus, clearly and sharply, the threat to the
established social order of the Deep South.

To escape this threat, the states affected began desperate quests
for ways of preserving the way of life of their people. In the despera-
tion of those quests, the states have taken steps that can well lead to
destruction of the way of life of all the people of America.

In their agony, those states have, by recommendations of advisory
committees, legislative resolutions or enactments, and constitutional
amendments, curtailed what American citizens have long accepted
as their traditional rights. The Advisory Committee on Segregation in
the Public Schools appointed in Texas to study the issue arising from
the court ruling pointed out that the "initial decision of May 17, 1954,
left the southern people confused and despairing, but as time pro-
gressed the realization dawned that there are many courses left open
to the states in their battle to preserve their dual school system"
(2: 1080).

Among the courses most widely adopted has been that of inter-
position, or the placing of the sovereignty of the state between the
power of the federal government and the execution of the Supreme

Court's decision within the state. Although the legislatures of at least eight Southern states passed variously worded acts of interposition, Act 254 of the Mississippi Laws of 1956 is most explicit. According to this law, the government of the state directs that all "members of the executive branch be and they are hereby directed to comply fully with . . . said Resolution of Interposition, and are further required to prohibit, by any lawful, peaceful and constitutional means, the implementation of or the compliance with the Integration Decision of the United States Supreme Court . . . and to prohibit . . . the implementation of any orders, rules, or regulations of any board, commission or agency of the federal government . . . to cause a mixing or integration of the white and negro races" (3).

Americans have, through the Constitution, achieved a right to government by law and a consistency between the levels of government. If one level of government may, by proclamation, ordinance, or enactment, nullify the effect of the law of the over-arching government, then the citizens' right to a government by law has become subject to the whim of the leaders of the most immediate level of government. It was this danger that the creators of the United States Constitution wanted to prevent when they wrote in Article VI, "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

This is a clear and definite description of a principle of consistency of government, a principle that Americans established and in which the people have a deeply vested right. The intensity of the agony of a state is suggested when it would destroy this right, as the Texas Advisory Committee would when it wrote recommending "individual, personal rejection of compliance with what is merely the latest expression of judicial opinion, refusal by every individual to observe a judgment to which he was not a party, and for the performance of which he is not liable. This individual protest and objection will be shown

in every lawful act of omission and commission,—as well as by written and spoken word. . . .

"Official action or non-action, as the case may be, of the legislative, local, state and district officials, boards, bureaus and departments, will be expressive of protest and objection to the extent and only to the extent that the incumbent officials utilize every legal means at their command to avoid and circumvent compliance, and to maintain a dual school system so long as the people of the state and the local communities desire it" (2: 1083).

And so, in their struggles to preserve segregation, one after another of the states of the South have restricted the right of their citizens to expect goverment by law. They have created precedent for other states, if aggrieved in some way, to deny the right to consistency between the requirements of local, state, and federal governments.

Americans have evolved the right to expect that the monies raised by general public taxation shall be used for public purposes and expended to or through public institutions. Although there have been exceptions to this principle, the exceptions have usually been individual misapplications of the law or acts of outright dishonesty. But to arrange that there be no mixing of the races in the schools, states of the South have enacted into law their willingness to abandon a principle of sound government.

In the precipitate action to shore up the crumbling structure of segregation, seven states have provided for the closing of the public schools. Typical of the states so legislating, Virginia, in a special session of the General Assembly in 1956, provided that the "local school board . . . is hereby authorized to transfer school funds, excluding those for capital outlay and debt service, without the consent of the tax-levying body, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, and to expend same in furtherance of the elementary and secondary education of the children . . . in non-sectarian private schools as may be permitted by law" (4).

The North Carolina General Assembly sought to accomplish the same purpose by amending the state constitution: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the General Assembly may provide for payment of educational expense grants from any state or local public funds for the private education of any child for whom no public school is available or for the private education of a child who is assigned against the wishes of his parent—to a public school attended by a child of another race" (5).

The legalizing of the use of public resources for private purposes or institutions has not been limited to finances. Typical of the laws modifying the expectation that governments will use public property for public service is Act No. 13 of the 1956 Session of the Georgia General Assembly. The law said that governing boards of school districts "shall have authority to lease any school house or other school property for private educational purposes to any person, group of persons or corporation which is or will be bona fide engaged in the operation of a private school" (6).

Nor have those elected or appointed to Southern state offices weighed heavily the right of the people to economical or efficient use of public resources, when measured against the urgency of maintaining segregation. Laws making tuition grants to children who object to integrated schools have been widely adopted. The Gray Commission of Virginia observed that "the payment of tuition grants in localities wherein public schools are operated may necessitate some expenditures beyond the adopted school budgets . . ." The Commission recommended that "it should be provided that the state bear one-half of any excess costs to the locality" (7).

In Louisiana, in cities over 300,000, as ordered in Senate Bill 350 of the 1956 Legislature, school buildings shall be classified for use by whites only or by Negroes only. In Georgia, when a Negro team asked to use a football field used by whites, the attorney general of the state ruled that "a colored school building should be considered as exclu-

sively for the use of colored children in the morning, afternoon, and night. The same rule applies as to white school buildings. This would be true regardless of the type of instruction being given in the school building, i.e. academic, vocational, or physical training.

"For segregation to remain an integral part of Georgia's social customs and traditions, it must be and will be practiced twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and three hundred and sixty-five days a year" (8).

In the contortions of the South to escape this feared thing, integration, states have acted to curtail the right of citizens to expect governments to limit the use of public funds for public purposes and through public institutions, and for governmental resources to be used with prudent regard for efficiency.

Important as these rights are, they are abstract, and it is likely that many in the South are willing to accept these encroachments to avoid the end of segregation. But other rights, more personal and more immediate, have become the victims of state action. These rights affect the citizens of the enacting states directly; and by precedent, all Americans.

Among the rights that Americans have guaranteed themselves, through the constitutions of all the states, is the right to free public schools. Because education has been a state function, there has been no similar provision in the United States Constitution. This right to free public schools has also been bludgeoned in the agony of the South to avoid integration. In ruling on a case in 1956, the Supreme Court of North Carolina pointed out that "No provision of the Constitution requires that a state maintain a system of public schools, whether attendance be compulsory or voluntary. This is exclusively a matter of state policy" (9).

The Virginia legislature invoked its police powers and legislated that "The Commonwealth of Virginia assumes direct responsibility for the control of any school . . . to which children of both races are

assigned and enrolled by any school authorities acting voluntarily or under compulsion of any court order. The making of such an assignment, and the enrollment of such child or children, shall automatically divest school authorities making the assignment and the enrollment of all further authority, power and control of such public school . . . and such school is closed and is removed from the public school system" (10).

The Alabama legislature arranged for a constitutional amendment proclaiming the policy of the state to provide education but specifying that "nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as creating or recognizing any right to education or training at public expense . . ." (11).

South Carolina abridged the right to free public education by enacting that "appropriations of state-aid for teachers' salaries, and all other school district, county and state appropriations for the operation of the public school system, shall cease and become inoperative for any school from which, and for any school to which, any pupil may transfer pursuant to, or in consequence of, an order of any court . . ." (12).

Seven states made decisions to the same end. The Texas Advisory Committee noted the common intent of these actions: "The pattern in each state varies . . . but all plans have one thing in common: the dual school system shall be maintained, or the entire public school system will be in jeopardy" (2: 1080).

With this voiding of the responsibility of the states to provide free public education, the right of the people to education becomes a revokable privilege, dependent upon legislative or executive responsiveness to other values, pressures, or caprice.

Closely akin to this form of escape from the integration decision is the qualification of compulsory school attendance laws. Residents of all the states have, in their respective states, determined that a basic education for all youth is essential. Our democracy created for itself the right to an educated citizenry and protected that right with com-

pulsory education laws. But this right became subordinate, in much of the South, to the struggle to keep segregation. Typical of the laws enacted making compulsory education secondary to segregation is that passed by the North Carolina General Assembly, in a Special Session in 1956. After restating the compulsory attendance requirement, the law includes this exception: "this requirement shall not apply with respect to any child when the board of education of the administrative unit in which the child resides finds that: (a) such child is now assigned against the wishes of his parent or guardian, . . . to a public school attended by a child of another race and it is not reasonable and practicable to reassign such child to a public school not attended by a child of another race; and (b) it is not reasonable and practicable for such child to attend a private non-sectarian school" (13).

Americans have come to expect, and to accept as a right, that the functioning of their public institutions shall be based on understandable principles, equally applicable to all using their services. They further presume that if aggrieved in the application of these principles to individual cases, the affected parties have, by right, recourse to speedy and equitable redress. However, both these rights become inconsistent with efforts to escape the effects of the desegregation ruling.

School placement laws have been widely enacted by many legislatures of the South. The laws gave the local boards of education authority to assign students to various schools on the basis of multitudinous factors, usually avoiding direct reference to race, although the intent to keep segregation was clear. The following excerpt from Act No. 201 of the Alabama Acts of the Regular Session of 1955 illustrates the maze of conditions that local boards may use in assigning a child to a particular school:

In the assignment, transfer, or continuance of pupils among and within the schools, or within the classroom and other facilities thereof, the following factors and the effects and results thereof shall be considered, with respect to the individual pupil, as well as other relevant matters: Available room and teaching

capacity in the various schools; the availability of transportation facilities; the effect of the admission of new pupils upon established or proposed academic programs; the suitability of established curricula for particular pupils; the adequacy of the pupil's academic preparation for admission to a particular school and curriculum; the scholastic aptitude and relative intelligence or mental energy or ability of the pupil; the psychological qualification of the pupil for the type of teaching and associations involved; the effect of admission of the pupil upon the academic progress of other students in a particular school or facility thereof; the effect . . . upon prevailing academic standards; the psychological effect upon the pupil . . . ; the possibility or threat of friction or disorder among pupils or others; the possibility of breaches of peace or ill-will or economic retaliation within the community; the home environment of the pupil; the maintenance or severance of established social and psychological relationships with other pupils and with teachers; the choice and interests of the pupil; the morals, conduct, health, and personal standards of the pupil; the request or consent of parents or guardians and the reasons assigned therefor[14].

Accompanying most of these assignment provisions there are established procedures for administrative review of cases in which the assigned pupils or their families wish to appeal the original decision. The appeals procedures are protracted, cumbersome, expensive, and so complex as to form an almost impossible means of redress. The procedures were developed with full legislative awareness of the principle that courts will not take jurisdiction in a civil case as long as there are unused administrative remedies. These laws then, in effect, were construed to preserve segregation by voiding the American right to a reasonable and prompt settlement of grievances.

This phase of the Southern struggle was soon challenged in the courts. In a ruling by the United States District Court in Louisiana, the judge wrote: "To remit each of these minor children and the thousands of others similarly situated to thousands of administrative hearings . . . to seek the relief to which the Supreme Court of the United States has said they were entitled, would be a vain and useless gesture, unworthy of a court of equity. It would be a travesty in which this court will not participate" (15). The Eastern Division of the United States District Court in Virginia rendered a similar opinion on September 14, 1957, saying, "The procedure . . . prescribed is too sluggish and prolix to constitute a reasonable remedial process" (16).

As the struggle against integration continued, the states became more and more aware of the channels through which segregation might disappear and took such legislative action as seemed necessary to block these channels. In 1957 the General Assembly of Tennessee stated that "It is . . . vital to the public interest that information . . . be obtained with respect to persons, firms, partnerships, corporations and associations whose activties are causing or may cause interracial tension and unrest" (17). The law then required any such person or organization to register with the state. A companion bill prohibited anyone who was not a party to litigation from soliciting or giving funds to support litigation. All who contribute to the support of litigation are to be listed with the secretary of state.

Arkansas, like several other segregated states, also passed a law requiring the listing of the names, addresses, and amounts of contributions of any who support racial litigation. The law declares, "It is hereby determined that persons, corporations, societies, organizations, and other groups of persons are engaged in certain unregulated activities which are designed to hinder, harass, and interfere with the powers and duties of the State of Arkansas to control and operate its domestic institutions according to its own judgment, and that such activities are inimical to the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of Arkansas" (18).

Though these bills were aimed primarily at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, their provisions were expressed in inclusive terms.

When the Southern governments intruded their powers on the rights of assembly and speech, they did not stop with proscriptions that affected the general population. Mississippi, for example, required all teachers, as a condition of employment, to file affidavits listing all organizations to which contributions have been made or in which membership is held or has been held for any part of the past five years. Louisiana's legislature determined that teachers may be removed for "being a member of or contributing to any group, organi-

zation, movement or corporation that is by law or injunction prohibited from operating in the State of Louisiana, or of advocating or in any manner performing any act toward bringing about integration of the races within the public school system . . ." (19).

Georgia reached even further. On April 22, 1957, its State Board of Education resolved that "no organization or group with clubs or chapters in public schools of Georgia shall be allowed to invite members of said clubs or chapters to participate in any conference, program or meeting where the white and negro students are mixed, nor shall said organizations or groups announce in the public schools of Georgia such racially mixed conferences . . ." (20). To be sure that the students yield to the power of the state, the State Board of Education further declared that "all organizations or groups now operating or in the future desiring to operate student clubs or chapters in the public schools of Georgia shall be required to affirm to the State Board of Education of intention to comply . . . and thus pledge not to plan or allow any racially mixed conferences, programs, or meetings. . . . Said organizations or groups shall be fully responsible and upon proof that students from the public schools of Georgia have been in attendance at any conference, program or meeting either within the State of Georgia or outside the State of Georgia at which the white and negro races are mixed, the organization of group holding, sponsoring or cooperating in such conference . . . shall cease to be a recognized school activity" (20).

Those who framed the First Amendment to the United States Constitution intended to guarantee the American rights of assembly and speech from the encroachments of government. These are rights existing apart from the control of government. Their preservation or destruction determines, in a large measure, whether the people control the state or the state controls the people. Though the latter is true in some other parts of the world, the pattern is not traditionally a part of the American way. These acts of state governments are direct challenges to these rights.

The intent of the Fifth Amendment, too, has been subordinated to the intent to escape integration. For those who gird themselves in the Fifth Amendment in racial inquiries, state legislation has been passed substituting trial by public opinion for trial by law. In setting up a commission on segregation, the Mississippi Legislature illustrated this trend. The legislature gave the commission authority to hold hearings and provided: "Should any witness refuse to testify to any fact or refuse to produce any book, document or paper touching which he is to be examined, on the ground that he will thereby incriminate himself, or that it will tend to discredit him or render him infamous, the commission shall consider such refusal as a part of the evidence and shall inform the public of the refusal of such witnesses to so testify, and the facts and circumstances under which such refusal was made" (21).

Thus the Southern states, striking in desperation at a feared thing, have pressed their power upon traditional American rights. Their struggles against integration have led to legislative curtailments of the rights to consistency between levels of governments; to the use of public funds and facilities for public purposes and through public institutions; to economical and efficient use of public resources; to public education; to an educated citizenry; to government by clear and equitable principles; to prompt and equitable redress of grievances; to group membership, assembly, and speech; to avoid self-incrimination.

Governor Collins of Florida, aware of this trend, wrote in his message vetoing a bill reinforcing segregation: "When men harbor hatred in their hearts for their fellow-men, it is a regrettable thing. But when government is used as an instrument for translating racial hatred into a force to destroy the very institutions which nurture and sustain it, then such is an even more serious wrong, and I condemn it" (22).

Judge Wright, ruling on a case in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, wrote, "The problem of changing a

people's mores, particularly those with an emotional over-lay, is not to be taken lightly. It is a problem which will require the utmost patience, understanding, generosity and forebearance from all of us, of whatever race. But the magnitude of the problem may not nullify the principle. And that principle is that we are . . . all of us . . . free-born Americans, with a right to make our way, unfettered by sanctions imposed by man because of the work of God" (15).

Certainly, the problems posed for the South by the desegregation decision are enormous. Segregation in their public schools is a part of a complex and long-established social pattern. The efforts of the South to resolve these problems require the sympathetic tolerance of other parts of the country not so directly affected. Nevertheless, when the result of the acts of the states represent repeated encroachments upon American rights, all Americans must be concerned. The sympathetic understanding of segregation problems must be accompanied by an attitude of vigilance to see that acts of desperation by state governments do not destroy the rights with which Americans have endowed themselves.

NOTES

1. Cited in *Brown et al.* v. *Board of Education of Topeka,* 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 653.

2. *Report of the Legal and Legislative Subcommittee of the Texas Advisory Committee on Segregation in the Public Schools, September 24, 1956,* as quoted in *Race Relations Law Reporter* (School of Law, Vanderbilt University), I (December, 1956), 1077–91.

3. *Mississippi Laws of 1956,* chap. 254, § 1.

4. *Acts of the 1956 Extra Session of the Virginia General Assembly,* chap. 62.

5. *1956 Extra Session Laws of the General Assembly of North Carolina,* chap. 1, § 1.

6. *Georgia General Assembly, 1956,* Act No. 13.

7. *Report of Commission on Public Education to the Honorable Thos. B. Stanley, Governor of Virginia, Nov. 11, 1955,* as quoted in the *Race Relations Law Reporter,* I (February, 1956), 244.

8. Letter from the Attorney General of Georgia to the Georgia State Superintendent of Schools, Feb. 1, 1956, as quoted in *Race Relations Law Reporter,* II (February, 1957), 266.

9. *Constantain et al.* v. *Anson County,* 244 N.C. 221, 93 S.E. (2d), 163.

10. *Acts of the 1956 Extra Session of the Virginia General Assembly,* chap. 68, § 3.

11. *Acts of the Legislature of Alabama, Special Session, 1956,* Act No. 82, § 3.

12. *Acts of the 1955 South Carolina Legislature,* Acts (49) 329.

13. *1956 Extra Session Laws of the General Assembly of North Carolina,* chap. 5, § 1.

14. *Alabama Law, Regular Session, 1955,* Act No. 201, § 4.

15. *Bush et al.* v. *Orleans Parish School Board et al.,* U.S. District Court, Eastern District, Louisiana, February 15, 1956, Civ. No. 3630.

16. *Thompson et al.* v. *County School Board of Arlington County, Virginia, et al.,* U.S. District Court, Eastern District, Virginia, September 14, 1957, Civ. No. 1341.

17. *Public Acts of the 1957 Tennessee General Assembly,* chap. 151, § 1.

18. *Acts of the 1957 Arkansas Legislature,* Act No. 85, § 10.

19. *1956 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature,* Act No. 249, § 1.

20. Resolution of the Georgia State Board of Education, April 22, 1957, as quoted in *Race Relations Law Reporter,* II (June, 1957), 715.

21. *1956 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature,* House Bill. No. 880, § 8.

22. Veto Message of Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida, on House Bill No. 671, of the 1957 Florida Legislature, as quoted in *Race Relations Law Reporter,* II (August, 1957), 844.

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The School Scene in Review

TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM FOR CURRICULUM PROBLEMS

An exasperated high-school teacher recently complained that, in education, we spend 95 per cent of our time identifying problems and 5 per cent resolving them. He was unwittingly generous in allotting such a high proportion of time to the resolution of problems, particularly if he meant resolving problems in any systematic fashion.

Countless educational problems await the attention of researchers. The articles by Woodruff and Fleming in this issue of the *School Review* clearly point up this fact. These articles also point up the lack of a systematic framework to guide the conduct and the interpretation of research. Thousands of studies are carried on every year by college professors, graduate students, and research bureaus of school systems. Some of these studies prove helpful in dealing with immediate problems. Most of the studies enjoy no such usefulness. They are tucked safely away in little-read research reports, journals, and theses. Only a handful are interpreted and organized in a way that throws light on some fundamental issue. As Woodruff says, we "have a wonderful time without going anywhere."

Nowhere in education is there greater need for a conceptual system to guide decision-making than in the field of curriculum. By a conceptual system, I mean a carefully engineered framework that performs the following functions: identifies the major questions to be answered in developing any instructional program; reveals the elements that tie these questions together in a system and the elements

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that separate questions from one another; identifies subordinate questions and classifies them properly in relation to major questions; reveals the data-sources to be used in answering the questions posed by the system; and suggests the relevance of data extracted from these sources. The system must be an evolving one; new research findings should suggest orderly changes in the system itself.

This is a tremendous burden of demands to be borne by a theoretical structure. But the burden is no greater than that carried by any scientific system. And education, like other social sciences, must become scientific if it is to provide for the systematic solution of its own problems.

A conceptual system is both more than a theory and less than a theory. It is more than a theory in that it identifies the need for, and the relevance of, theory. It is less than a theory in that it only suggests the relevance of specific data. A conceptual system does not explain phenonema or the consequences of thought and action. For example, in dealing with the problem of determining educational objectives, a conceptual system in the field of curriculum must show the relevance of theories about the nature of man. Furthermore, the conceptual system should guide the use of any theory on man's nature to the task of determining educational objectives. But the conceptual system does not provide the logic whereby a specific objective is inferred from a given view of the nature of man.

Theoretical considerations of some sort, however inadequate they may be, are present in virtually all decision-making. But what is lacking more often than not is a conceptual system to identify related decisions and to provide consistency in decision-making.

Recently the writer reviewed a document prepared to guide curriculum improvement in a city school system. Compared with similar statements—and most schools prepare them—it is a good piece of work. But the document suggests that the authors were working with no conceptual system at all or with an inadequate one. In all probability there was no system.

The document identifies the basic values of democracy and the functions of the school in a democratic society. Apparently, the functions of the school should in some way follow or depend on the values presumed for life in a democracy. But the nature of that relationship and the method of deriving school functions from societal values are not made clear. The document goes on to list demands imposed by a democratic society and to pose goals for education. Of necessity, value-judgments are involved in moving from an analysis of society to an elaboration of desirable educational objectives. Do we educate individuals to adjust to a particular characteristic of society, or do we educate individuals to revise society? Value-theory is involved, but just where and how the document does not make clear.

Next the report examines the needs of the individual. The purpose of the examination is to set up methods of teaching. Yet, in the introduction to the section, the authors state that instructional goals are clarified by examining characeristics of the human personality. If the principle is sound, should not the school examine learners to determine what as well as how to teach? Should not an analysis of learners precede as well as follow the stating of educational objectives? And should not the purpose of examining learners before the formulation of educational objectives be quite different from the purpose of examining learners after the objectives have been formulated?

These observations are offered not to indict a particular school system but to illustrate the lack of a conceptual system in the curriculum field. After all, individual schools, preoccupied as they are with the practical task of improving their programs, simply reflect the relative unsophistication of theoretical inquiry into curriculum.

Several articles in this issue of the *School Review* reveal questions and data-sources with which a conceptual system in a curriculum must deal. These articles also reveal conspicuous gaps in present curriculum theory.

Seeley and Johnson are preoccupied with the question: What are schools for? These writers make it clear that the nature of the universe

and of human nature set limits to educational objectives. What are schools for? Here is an important curriculum question. Here, too, are data-sources for dealing with it. So far, so good. But then the process becomes complicated. Seeley writes: "The minimum conditions that preserve a society—any society" set limits to educational aims. And to these limits he adds others—the minimum conditions for the survival of a human being. In setting forth his first condition for the survival of a human being, Seeley assumes that we want "an independent human being." What is the source of such an assumption? How does one derive the minimum conditions that will preserve a society or an individual—conditions which, presumably, education must sustain and promote?

Data for dealing with this question may be found in such fields as philosophy, psychology, and anthropology. These fields deal with first questions. For example: what is the nature of man and the world and the good life in a good society? Though the questions are not pointed at the curriculum itself, the answers are essential for curriculum analyses. Unfortunately, answers to these basic questions are tentative at best. Current views of the good life in the good society, for example, are largely speculative and often controversial. As a consequence, the task of determining curriculum objectives is characterized by speculation and controversy. These limitations do not lessen the need to continually seek a conceptual system whereby curriculum questions and the data-sources for dealing with them are identified and interrelated.

The papers by Louise Tyler and Israel Scheffler illustrate this last point. Tyler turns to psychoanalysis as a possible fruitful foundation for developing curriculum theory. But Tyler does not allow herself to become preoccupied with the problems of psychoanalysis as ends in themselves. Rather, as a curriculum specialist, she proceeds with a clearly formulated conceptual system in view. This system—implicit throughout the article—poses the curriculum questions; psychoanalysis becomes a data-source in dealing with the questions. The findings

of psychoanalysis become subject matter to consider in examining issues concerning curriculum, not psychoanalysis.

Tyler presents psychoanalytic concepts that seem related to curriculum concerns. She tests the usefulness of these concepts by applying them to three curriculum questions encompassed by her conceptual system in this field. The implication is that she has formulated at least a tentative conceptual system in curriculum.

The procedure avoids a shortcoming often present in efforts to draw implications for education from fields assumed to be related. There is a tendency to become enamoured of the related field; preoccupation with the problems of that field soon pushes educational questions and issues into the background. Such digressions may explain why, up to now, investigations into other disciplines have been so unrewarding in dealing with both practical and theoretical problems of education.

Scheffler's approach is refreshingly unique in the field of curriculum. He identifies a significant problem: the selection of curriculum content. The age-old controversy over the teaching of students or subject matter is quickly disposed of. Scheffler is basically concerned with only one problem. His singleness of purpose, together with his method of inquiry to achieve that purpose, take him nicely around a trap into which many curriculum workers fall. The trap is that of answering every question on curriculum in relation to decisions on some other question.

For example, textbooks on curriculum are wont to say that content must be selected in relation to educational objectives. This is a nice weaselly statement that says virtually nothing and yet cannot be denied. Having read it, what does the teacher do? He knows only that, for students to learn to solve science problems, the content must be drawn from the field of science. But what science topics should be selected? On the basis of the criterion given, the teacher is on his own to use any procedure, or none, to justify decisions on curriculum content.

The curriculum field is full of such traps. The textbooks say that, in determining educational objectives, curriculum-makers must examine the characteristics of learners and of society. What characteristics? And how does one move from the identification of characteristics to the formulation of desirable educational objectives?

Can a conceptual system identify the method of inquiry involved in moving intellectually from data-sources to specific answers for various questions posed by such a system? In this writer's judgment, the system must do so, or we shall continue to make important curriculum decisions in the haphazard fashion evident in current curriculum development.

We need, then, a theoretical system to guide our approach to curriculum problems. Such a system must deal with such questions as the following:

What sources are pertinent for determining educational objectives? What is the relative significance of these sources?

How should the desirability of specific objectives be determined? How should the feasibility of attaining objectives be determined?

What is the usefulness of a statement of educational objectives in making other curriculum decisions?

What components must be considered in organizing the curriculum for effective learning?

How much synthesis of these components can and should be effected for the teacher before he begins his teaching.

What elements, if any, are common to all major curriculum questions and thus provide theoretical links throughout the entire conceptual system?

At what points in the system should consideration of the method and content of organized knowledge predominate?

What methods of inquiry are pertinent to each major decision posed by the system?

As we get a clearer idea of what to expect of a conceptual system,

we shall know more precisely what organized knowledge to turn to in resolving curriculum issues. Some fields may prove unrewarding. We shall then know that there is no point in coming back to them for knowledge they cannot yield. Other fields may prove potentially rewarding but too immature to provide the answers needed. We shall then know that it may be worth our while to keep coming back to see what new developments have to offer.

To search outside education for answers to educational problems will be fruitless until we develop a conceptual system that points to directions for resolving the problems in education itself.

ENLIVENING EDUCATION IN THE JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL

The junior high school is unique in American education. This school sprang from a belief that boys and girls passing from childhood to adolescence should be grouped together during this period of transition.

The elementary and secondary schools were shaped by forces that have very little to do with the nature of the children who attend these schools. The 6–6, 7–5, and 8–4 patterns of organization that emerged in various sections of the country were determined more by economic than by educational forces. Even the nursery school and kindergarten, with their roots in venerable educational lore, received their impetus in the United States from the wartime need to provide day care for children of working mothers. Economic analysis can explain much in American education.

The junior high school, however, reflects increased knowledge of child development and increased concern for children resulting from twentieth-century research and experimentation. But, after accounting for organizational pattern, the relationship to child development ends. The junior high school has not yet realized anything close to the cherished hopes of its creators.

We have not yet made up our minds whether the junior high school should be an upward extension of elementary education or a down-

ward extension of secondary education. Actually, it is a great deal of both, though it should be precious little of either.

The years in junior high school should be a time of re-awakening for the child who entered first grade with a lively sense of curiosity that gradually faded as he moved through the graded lock-step of prescribed content. Junior high school should present an open field to the academic sprinter who year after year chafed at grade barriers, impatiently waiting for his slower classmates to catch up with him. Junior high school should offer an accepting, understanding, and encouraging setting for the non-reader who long ago came to believe that to fail to read is to sin.

But the junior high school has become a monster of bells, periods, grades, and credits. Should we strip it down and start over?

The experience of educators who revised teacher education at Adelphi College, Emory University, and the University of Chicago, to name a few places, offers a suggestion. You build a new program by experimenting while you keep the old one running. Then you decide whether you want to abandon the new as an ill-conceived brainstorm, or revise the old in the light of the new, or make the experimental program the standard one, allowing the old program to graduate with the students who came through it. This method may be called trial by effectiveness.

An innovation at Sarasota Junior High School in Florida is now undergoing trial by effectiveness. In 1956–57, two committees tackled two problems simultaneously: the problem of revising the curriculum and the problem of providing for students with special abilities. The latter came to be a spearhead in experimentation in curriculum, for the faculty soon saw that every child has special needs, abilities, and disabilities, none of which the school can by-pass.

The curriculum seemed so formidable and the recommendations for change so weakly supported by evidence that the faculty decided to leave the old program untouched while introducing a new one. The daily schedule was juggled to provide another class period, and

the new interval became a time for pioneering, with tradition thrown to the winds.

Four major kinds of opportunities emerged. For the academically gifted—the children who under the old program had waited for the rest—there were opportunities to run ahead in foreign languages, mathematics, or science. For children talented in areas outside the curriculum, there were opportunities to roam in subjects inadequately explored in the past. For children interested in electricity, fish, plastics, or rocks, there were opportunities to explore unhampered by demands of grades and other expectations. For those cloaking the scars of past defeats, there were opportunities to try again, free from the inhibiting threat of failure.

It could be argued that all schooling should have such scope. Schooling should and it could, but it doesn't. We talk about over-hauling what we have and we spend many man-hours in the effort, but somehow, in spite of all we do, things come out pretty much as they were before. Because the job of rebuilding is too big to tackle in its entirety, we usually content ourselves with a new coat of paint.

The faculty of Sarasota Junior High School is now asking itself what lessons have been learned or could be learned from the new venture. What makes a class stimulating and fascinating? What teaching techniques seem to be most effective for the gifted? The retarded? How is critical thinking best promoted? How can basic skills be measured so that one child's development can be identified?

Such questions go to the heart of the learning-teaching process. A faculty that is seriously interested in doing something about them in even a small way assures an enlivened educational program.

THE HIGH-SCHOOL SQUEEZE

The American high school is being subjected to an ideological squeeze. It could lose its vitality, if not its life, in the process.

The lower jaw of the vise is the elementary school. Here, for several decades, a philosophy has been growing in strength: "Take

the child from where he is to as far as he can go." It is argued that children entering first grade differ widely in their intellectual capacity and personality traits. Because these differences become more pronounced as the children progress through school, it is unrealistic to set common standards to be attained by all before leaving the elementary school. This point of view has encouraged the development of educational programs uniquely suited for a given stage of child development. Today, elementary education is only moderately affected by considerations of "what the secondary school expects."

The upper jaw of the vise is the college. Generations of college teachers and students have been beguiled, intrigued, or bedeviled by notions of "college-level" work. Faculty members pore over statistics comparing the scores of their students on various national examinations with the scores of students of other colleges. As one college registrar candidly and sagely admitted, "The best way to get good scores is to accept only good students."

The cry goes down from the college, "Bring them up to standard." The cry goes up from the elementary school, "Take them from where they are."

Pity the high school and the high-school teacher in between!

"Bring them up to standard." "Take them from where they are." A mighty gulf lies between the two demands. Four, five, or even six years is a short bridge for spanning this gulf. It is unlikely that the high school can span it successfully. Nor should it try.

The increasing vitality of the elementary school has stemmed in large measure from the relatively clear perceptions of teachers and the American people as to the purposes of that school. Similarly, the American college of arts and science is virtually unique in the world, resisting wherever it can the pressure to provide specialized preparation for some other educational unit. Admittedly, this uniqueness becomes more and more difficult to maintain.

The American high school enjoyed its most vigorous years when it seemed to serve a well-clarified function. And individual schools, such as those involved in the Eight-Year Study, came to life when

they were engaged in defining a role not imposed by other educational institutions.

If secondary education is to avoid becoming a formless mass separating elementary from higher education, high schools across the land must join in defining their unique functions. These functions must be defined out of context but in relation to the other levels of education. We visualize a continuous, sequential system of American education, each level performing a function, not because the rest of the system depends on that function, but because the function is unique in the system.

High-school education must not be regarded chiefly as preparation for something else. To the extent that this unit of American education succeeds in clarifying a function unto itself, it will find its vitality and provide education suited to the demands of life and higher education.

Three recent volumes center on the high school, its past contributions, present problems, and future direction: *The High School in a New Era*, edited by Francis S. Chase and Harold A. Anderson (University of Chicago Press, 1958), a collection of thirty-eight papers delivered at a national conference on the American high school held at the University of Chicago; *The High School in a Changing World*, the 1958 yearbook of the American Association of School Administrators; and *What's Happened to Our High Schools?* by John F. Latimer (Public Affairs Press, 1958).

Is this intensified interest in clarifying the role of the American high school shared by the educators most actively involved in the conduct of secondary education? Are there suggestions that the elementary school should in some way reorganize to reduce the high-school squeeze? Will national attention be focused next on the four-year college? Or is present concern just a layer of muggy atmosphere that will pass over, leaving the high school essentially unchanged?

We earnestly hope that reflection, widespread research, and vigorous action will produce an increasingly exciting learning environment for young people of high-school age.

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Educational Research and the Curriculum

Educational research is a phrase that currently stands for everything from the use of reference books by elementary-school pupils to the most rigorous and systematic experimentation by trained personnel. A great deal of what passes as educational research is of extremely doubtful validity. Although a subjective version of research literally runs wild among administrative and teaching personnel, the role of good research in education is still undefined.

Educational program planning, which should be based on research, has had to proceed on a basis that is dominantly subjective. Those who plan school programs have had to cope with psychological, sociological, philosophical, political, economic, and pedagogical forces, without the help of an adequate fact-finding system. Some decisions have been made deliberately, some unwittingly, and some by default. As a result, the soundness of a number of school practices may be seriously challenged.

We in education work out excellent lists of objectives, but when we plan curriculums, we pay little or no attention to our lists. Our first step in setting up educational programs is rarely the analysis of objectives. The customary procedure, especially at the elementary level, is to turn to children's interests and developmental tasks and to work out a program based on them. Using this approach, we

develop classroom programs that have a general relationship to our major objectives, but, because we do not work from objectives to programs, it is sometimes very difficult to show any precise relationship between the two.

We are in sore need of practical steps that will take us from the major objectives of education to classroom materials and procedures. We need to find out how to identify the concepts, the proficiencies, the language, and the feelings needed to reach objectives. Our subject-matter experts need to learn how to select from their systematic masses of knowledge the concepts and proficiencies required to reach an objective. These specialists need to learn how to arrange concepts and proficiencies in the order of most effective learning. Our subject-matter experts need, further, to find out how to tell which concepts are of little or no worth to the citizen who will not become a research scholar in their field.

Educators are dedicated to the proposition that children learn by doing, but this concept, which is founded on a precise concept of learning, is applied in a very loose way to teaching. In most respects, learning is a specific process. However, in our schools we find widespread use of social experience that is relatively unstructured and free. We tacitly expect that from this lifelike activity will emerge democratic behaviors, vocational competence, morality, and scholarship. Curriculum literature seldom recognizes the fact that concepts, symbolic memorization, motor proficiency, feelings, and habits all develop by their own processes. Teachers rarely discuss the specific processes that are apparently expected to produce certain ends. In fact, teachers seem to be unfamiliar with these processes.

In this connection, we sorely need a simpler and more defensible set of concepts about teaching methods. Our colleges often coach prospective teachers in methods that are unnecessarily complicated and sometimes unsound, methods that are discarded in the classroom. Often, student teachers try so hard to fit a "method" into the class-

room that they lose sight of the student, the objective, and the subject matter. We need a set of concepts that are psychologically sound, concepts that can be grasped by a Sophomore, yet will not have to be abandoned or altered when the Sophomore becomes an advanced student or an experienced teacher.

We acknowledge unendingly that we must "meet the students' needs." However, we educators have sharply revised the psychologists' concept of need. To most psychologists, a need is a condition essential to maintain adjustment in an organism; without that condition, the organism is driven to action. To educators, a need is something that is desirable for the student. The difference between these two concepts is tremendous.

The first represents a powerful influence that drives the person to action or to maladjustment. The meeting of needs so defined is a necessary prelude to learning in its full sense. The second concept of need is a loose mixture. The educator says that students need rich experiences, challenge, democratic participation. Each of these items may very well be "desirable." But do students "need" them? Certainly, the absence of such offerings will not arouse and sustain behavior. Consequently, any instructional plan that tries to "capitalize on a child's needs," in the loose sense, will face serious problems of motivation unless the teacher applies other incentives or pressures. On the other hand, an instructional plan that concentrates on psychological needs will deal mostly with life adjustment, whether we like that phrase or not.

Let me come back to the fact that the major objectives of education are not playing a vital role in curriculum planning. The fact seems to result from preoccupation with interests, needs, and adjustment. Education should be less interested in what people need than in what they ought to have. A few basic needs must be satisfied to keep the person well enough adjusted to learn. Beyond that, education should be directed toward learning that has little to do with current

needs. The teacher must provide adequate stimulation for this learn-
ing by unlocking the attractiveness of the subject matter itself and
by cultivating the students' inner discipline.

For three years, our staff has been engaged in a study of the cur-
riculum in our own laboratory schools. We have found that catchy
subjects like magnetism are taught in all grades from second through
ninth. At the same time we have found significant gaps in nearly every
subject-matter field. It has become fairly clear to us that each teacher
is important in determining how thorough and how well integrated
the curriculum is. Still we have found little communication among
teachers on curriculum matters.

The basic unit in the curriculum, we have concluded, is the con-
cept. To know what is being taught in school, it is essential to identify
the concepts that the students are actually learning. However, most
classroom teachers we worked with did not know what a concept is.
They could not differentiate between a topic, a concept, an objective,
a learning activity, and teaching materials. It has taken us two years
to get a picture of what the students are actually learning. The pic-
ture does not always coincide with course outlines, lists of objectives,
topics set up as guides, or the teacher's description of what he does
with his class.

In our study we have discovered curriculum-planning procedures
that seem to produce a program based on objectives set up for the
program. The procedures are based on clear statements of concepts
and proficiencies. During the next two years, we hope to compare the
new program with the old by taking groups of students through
both programs at the same time.

Major decisions on the curriculum involve several areas. Although
the areas are interrelated, there is no systematic attempt to consider
those areas together when decisions are being made. In fact, most
decisions on curriculum are arrived at, not by a carefully thought-
out problem-solving procedure, but by gradual evolution on the basis

of a so-called philosophy or general pattern of operation. The approach is piecemeal. This is an excellent way to spin wheels, to have a wonderful time without going anywhere.

There is something wrong with the way we make decisions in education. A good trouble-shooting procedure begins by locating the source of trouble.

One of the chief sources of difficulty, I believe, lies in a confusion of roles. In every complete enterprise three roles must be filled. Someone must make value judgments and establish goals. Someone must find facts or carry on research. Someone must use facts to set up a program that will reach goals effectively and efficiently. These roles require different preparation, different procedures, and often different personalities. Almost every educator plays all three roles and may shift from one to another without being aware of the change.

The individual who takes the philosopher's role usually decides what goal should be attained, whether in a research requirement or an educational objective. The individual who takes the role of researcher starts with the goal, confers with the practitioner on the working approach to the goal, identifies the facts needed to make decisions, then plans and carries out the research. The individual who takes the role of the practitioner starts with the determined goal and lays out a path to it, governing himself by the facts made available through research. He then perfects the operation and carries it out. The continued modification of the enterprise should be the result of all three roles.

It is inadvisable for any person to take more than one of these roles for a given enterprise. Each role demands its own preparation. Each role is a full-time job. It is highly improbable that a really good administrator or teacher can find the time and energy for sound research. Likewise, it is highly improbable that a really good researcher can find the time and energy for administration or teaching. Each role is emotionally absorbing and has its own outlook. It is highly

important that those who fill one role recognize, respect, and know the premises and methods of the other roles.

The role of the practitioner in education is reasonably well recognized. It is provided for in the certification programs for teachers and administrators and in the typical program for a doctorate in education.

The role of the philosopher in education is only partly recognized. The philosopher as such has disappeared from the faculties of some colleges of education. His erstwhile contribution, or the part of it that the rest of the staff feels is worth preserving, is made partly through methods courses, orientation courses, or by contagion from the faculty, who may or may not be active carriers. The fact that school patrons also belong in this role is often overlooked. However, the practitioner is strongly convinced that he should play the role of philosopher. The conviction is especially noticeable among teachers, who believe with some justification that goals should be made in light of knowledge of operating problems. It is hard for most educators to accept the fact that in the school enterprise they are not consumers and stockholders but employees of the community. Teachers and administrators should keep the public informed of facts important in setting goals, and certainly teachers and administrators may express their desires and values through channels open to the community. However, it is not in keeping with the American concept of education for schoolmen to set up the goals of education.

The role of the researcher in education is still undefined. As evidence, let me cite the fact that public school systems have very few true research positions. What, then, does a person do if he wishes to spend his life in educational research? He joins the faculty of a college of education, where he has a full load of teaching and tries to do his research on the side. Now and then, he is relieved for the purpose. Much research carried on under these circumstances is not directly applicable to school programs, partly because each researcher tends to follow his own special interests.

The indefiniteness of the researcher's role can be illustrated fur-

ther. What does the administrator or teacher do when he is faced with a decision affecting the school program? He may call a conference of schoolmen, at which they all review the literature on practice elsewhere. He may use the grass-roots approach. Through extension courses, conferences, and workshops, he may arouse interest in the preparation of a curriculum. If he feels that the problem should be "studied," he may turn to the engaging process known as "action research." He has been told that in this approach any intelligent try to find something that works is a move in the right direction. Thus he embarks on what Broudy calls an experimental, but not an objective, approach to truth. Experimentalism without the objective check of the scientific method depends on the subjective impressions of the experimenter. The process is a tempting one, but I fear that it has been responsible for many conclusions that objective research might have prevented.

It is necessary that we define the fact-finding role within, not outside of, the educational program. It is essential that we make clear to everyone concerned the place of fact-finding in education, its relation to the school pattern, the administrator, the teacher, and those who set goals. At the same time, we must help practitioners delimit their concepts of their own roles and accept the more modest and safe practice of teamwork.

The development of a "rationale of educational research"—to use the title of an extremely stimulating session at the St. Louis meeting of the American Educational Research Association in February, 1948 —would add clarity and system to the whole educational program. In developing that rationale, several problems are inevitably involved. First, the roles discussed here must be clarified. Next, a master plan based on educational functions must be drawn up. We should probably identify essential areas of decision and practice in education without regard to the kinds of data required to resolve them. For each of these areas we should identify the important factors on which we need data. This kind of plan ought to be used as a guide

in all program-planning activities. Another master plan may be needed, a plan consisting of a set of researchable topics stemming from, but not necessarily organized by, educational functions. This plan could guide long-range research.

There is a difference between research that is a function of science and research that is a function of a working program. Where research is the function of a certain field, the researcher is free to follow the data, build the structure of knowledge as facts come up, and go in whatever direction the research findings point. Where research is the function of a working program, the researcher begins, not with a spark of curiosity, but with a pressing problem and remains close to that problem.

Even in plans based on research topics rather than operational problems, there is still some reference to educational problems, since the research categories are derived from school problems. Those who work in one of these orientations should be aware of what is being done in the other and take it into account in planning.

We need a clear statement of philosophical positions that have a significant influence on the concept of research. In education, both the practitioner and the researcher need to be aware of the concept of knowledge that they are using, what it means for research, and how it will affect the educational program. To this end, I commend Harry S. Broudy's *Building a Philosophy of Education* (Prentice-Hall, 1954) as both sound and readable.

Studies may vary from the most tentative outline to the most detailed analysis; from straight inductive generalizing and formation of good hunches to rigorous deductive demonstration and verification; from the first formation of instruments and techniques to the most careful measurement and evaluation. Sometimes the researcher and the practitioner may set the dimensions of a study. Sometimes the nature of the problem will determine the dimensions of an inquiry.

Criteria for the validity of data must be established, criteria that can be applied regardless of the dimensions of the study, criteria

suitable for both long-range and problem-centered research, criteria appropriate for determining the proper use of data in program-planning activities.

Now to return to the curriculum and to the areas of administrative decision that might lead to the formulation of problems for research. The areas we are especially interested in here have certain characteristics that undergo fairly definite changes from kindergarten through college. These areas have a significant relation to to the processes of learning and adjustment. However, it is not clear whether the changes are appropriately related to the broad, accepted objectives of education or to the maturity of the student and his characteristics at each school level. It does seem probable that the degree of the relationship may be the most important factor in helping the student achieve full growth. Hence these areas seem to offer a profitable basis for research that can be applied to practical school problems.

I shall list here the broad questions I have identified so far, along with the range of practice now followed in these areas, the assumed factors on which practice is based, and detailed questions to pinpoint inquiry.

To what extent should students be conducted through grades and courses at the same rate? In the typical elementary school there is almost complete regimentation controlled by uniform age at entrance and the practice of social promotion. In the upper division and graduate school of the university, age is rarely a factor in determining progress, which depends largely on the student's capacity and efforts. However, this kind of variation does not occur to any marked degree until after graduation from high school.

Among the assumed factors that determine practice are the capacity and industry of the pupil; contemporary beliefs about social adjustment of pupils; administrative convenience in the schools; the

value to the student and to the community of getting individuals into productive roles as soon as possible.

Researchers might profitably seek answers to such questions as the following: Are there ways in which individual students can be encouraged to progress at their own best rate without hindering the orderly operation of our schools? Can classes in the elementary school be so conducted that pupils are on their own for setting the pace in learning, while the teacher furnishes the necessary help for each child? Do we know enough about adjustment and its relationship to a productive life to enable us to make valid decisions about acceleration practices? Which is wiser—to advance students together or to accelerate those with superior capacity? Are there ways of permitting individual advancement to go on smoothly when students move from one school level to the next?

To what extent is subject matter presented in original concrete form? In symbolic form? In the earliest grades, almost all learning materials are real and concrete. In advanced university programs, materials in some fields become completely symbolic and in others largely so. Our schools present us with two almost diametric opposites. Many elementary-school programs use life-centered experiences that offer abundant opportunity to develop concepts at an elementary level but pay little or no systematic attention to organized subject matter. Many advanced programs consist exclusively of logically organized subject matter and pay no attention to its relation to life or to the demands of the learning process. The first practice is most common in the lower grades, and the second in advanced programs.

Assumed factors that determine practice in this area include the process of forming concepts; the increasing capacity of students to work with abstractions and symbols; students' capacity to understand data presented in logical or scientific categories and forms instead of phenomenal and natural forms, and students' capacity to use the data in practical situations.

Among the questions that might be explored are the following: How early in a child's life can teachers use word symbols to carry the child to the next higher level of conceptual learning? How does the child's capacity to learn from word symbols change through the grades? When symbols rather than concrete and real materials are used, does learning move more or less rapidly? What is the most effective combination of symbolic instruction and concrete teaching materials for each grade? How can we determine at what point in a student's education it becomes advantageous to present him with material that is organized logically rather than phenomenally? Is this point the same in general education and in special or professional education?

In each grade, how much of the subject matter in the pupil's universe does the curriculum include? The kindergarten curriculum includes the whole of the child's universe; nothing is left out. Consequently, nothing gets very much attention. In the university, there is a high degree of selectivity and exclusiveness. Not only are entire fields of study left out for a student once he begins to specialize; but, as specialization increases, most aspects of the major field are dropped till finally the student concentrates on one segment only. At present, this characteristic of public education seems to be under heaviest fire from critics of the modern educational program. The heart of the problem may well be the manner in which curriculum content is determined.

Among the assumed factors that determine practice are the requirements of the society for a general education; the requirements for proficiency in a vocation; the relationship between subject matter and the accepted objectives of education; the amount of time available in the life of an individual for education; students' interests and abilities.

Curriculum-makers could use research findings on the following questions: What role do the objectives of public education actually

play in determining the curriculum at each school level? Do we know how to select the most important subject matter for each grade? Can vocational proficiency be attained without starting vocational preparation in the elementary school? What does analysis of the elementary- and the secondary-school curriculums show about their relevance and value for each of the objectives of the Educational Policies Commission or for items in any other comparable set of objectives? Do we know how to develop curriculums designed to achieve objectives? Do we know the relationship between those objectives and all subject-matter fields? Do we know the relationship between those objectives and the selection of content within any field of subject matter?

To what extent is the plan of teaching centered on producing adjustment? On producing new growth? Even in the primary grades, there is considerable variation on this score. In some schools, the philosophy is dominantly one of "meeting the needs" of the child and making him feel adjusted; whereas, in most advanced college programs, the chief emphasis is on academic learning and the development of marketable proficiencies. This characteristic of education is also under heavy fire from both educators and non-educators. Opinion differs sharply on the value and necessity of devoting much time or effort in school to helping young people get along with others or solve their own personal problems.

Practice is determined by assumed factors that include the amount of provision for security a student requires to enable him to remain well enough adjusted to learn effectively; the amount of instructional pressure for learning a student can profitably absorb; the demands of the society for learning at a given rate and to a given level.

Researchers might profitably study such questions as these: How dominant is the objective of life adjustment in determining the program in elementary, secondary, and higher education? How much of the students' need for security should be met through the cur-

riculum? How much should be met through counseling programs? How rapidly can the majority of students master the basic subjects without undue risk of mental disturbance?

To what extent do teachers sponsor psychologically appropriate learning processes for the four principal kinds of learning: conceptual, symbolic, affective, and motor? It is probably not possible to say whether the appropriateness of teaching techniques varies by grade, but it is reasonably certain that the appropriateness of the techniques varies greatly from teacher to teacher. This area of decision lies partly in the hands of those who plan curriculums and courses of study and partly in the hands of the individual teacher. One major factor that influences the choice of techniques seems to be the preparation given to teachers before and during service. Their preparation is, in turn, significantly affected by how well the facts of learning are interpreted to them and used in the formulation of teacher-education programs.

Practice in this area is determined by such assumed factors as the psychological nature of the subject matter and the nature of the learning process for each type of learning.

Investigation might well cover such questions as the following: What facts about learning are most valuable to classroom teachers? What kind of experiences must college students have before they can perceive and use these facts? What is the best role of psychological information in planning curriculums and courses? What is the role of psychology in the development of teaching methods?

How many teachers does a pupil have during any one year? In the elementary school, the children have a single teacher all year. In college, a student may have fifteen or more teachers in a school year. In most schools, the pupil-teacher ratio does not change up to sixth grade. After sixth grade, the ratio changes in steps, one for

core programs, one for senior high school programs, and another for college.

Practice is determined by such assumed factors as the amount of adjustment a child of a given age can make to people in school and the degree of specialization required of a teacher to give a student at a certain level the best education.

Educators who plan school programs could use sound information on the following questions: Are these changes appropriate in light of students' personal development and educational requirements? Could pupils in the upper elementary grades profit from teachers who are better prepared in subject matter than elementary-school teachers usually are? Do children in the elementary school need the security that comes from having a single teacher for seven years?

To what extent does the classroom constitute a secure self-contained universe for the pupil? In kindergarten, the classroom is completely self-contained all day and all year. All the resources and learning materials that the pupil uses are in the room. The self-contained classroom generally extends through the first six grades. Pupils in the upper grades may use the library or a workroom that is separate from the classroom and the children may go out on brief field trips. At the university, the classroom is nothing more than a place to meet for one period; all resources are located elsewhere; most of the learning activities take place outside the room. Laboratories and special-purpose rooms are exceptions to the arrangement.

In this area, the following assumed factors determine practice: the amount of stability in the environment required for the adjustment of the pupil and the scope of the phenomena the learner must have access to for his educational requirements at any given level.

We could use more evidence on at least two questions: At what point in children's growth and development do they no longer require the security of the classroom? How early do the pupils' educational

requirements outstrip the capacity of the self-contained classroom to meet them?

How much of the child's environment should the subject matter in any given learning situation cover? In kindergarten and first grade there is almost no differentiation of subject matter. Activities are composed largely of normal lifelike activities in which no part of the environment is singled out for special study. As the child moves through school, there is more and more specialization in subject matter. In junior high school, the single classroom with its full subject-matter coverage yields to a core program or to a departmental program, and the senior high school is almost completely departmentalized.

The assumed factor that determines practice in this area is the process of concept formation, its stages and variations. We may well look into several questions: Do we know students' potentialities for specialized study at any given age? How closely does this set of changes approximate students' potential for specialized study? When should a particular subject be given specialized treatment in school?

How mature and complex should the subject matter be in each grade? In kindergarten, subject matter is still as gross as the child's concepts. The child does not differentiate life by such categories as arithmetic, spelling, fine arts. Most children do not have even the most elementary concepts of subject-matter fields as such. In graduate school, students customarily work with abstractions and generalizations on a mature level, and in the form developed by researchers, with little thought to learnability. Curriculum studies show considerable repetition of what seem to be identical concepts through as many as eight successive years of school. There is also evidence that some mature concepts are presented to students before they are prepared to cope with them, while some simple concepts are presented to students some time after they are ready for more mature concepts.

Practice in this area is determined by assumptions on the process of concept formation and the pupils' rate of advancement. Do we know how to identify the concepts in a given subject by their level of maturity and their sequential interdependence? Do we know which concepts in a given subject are essential for advanced learning and which are not? Do we know how to identify the concepts common to two or more fields of subject matter? Do we know how to present these concepts so they will serve all fields involved without wasteful repetition? How much could students' education be accelerated if the curriculum were geared to the students' psychological characteristics?

I believe that the first step we should take to improve education is to draw up a blueprint of problems. Next we should select all the research now on the books that meets the tests of validity. We should apply this research wherever it fits in the blueprint. I suggest that those responsible for curriculum then take a fresh look at the practices named here. I am not interested in rating present school practices as sound or silly. I am interested in pointing out that our practices have not been subjected to systematic analysis. It is high time we did more systematic investigation.

At Brigham Young University, we are formulating a university-wide program of research for a long-term study of the curriculum from the first day of school through graduate school. What we see before us at the moment has that buzzing, booming quality that James spoke of in his description of the infant's view of the world.

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Improving Instruction through Curriculum Research

We Americans are avid consumers of research. When we are ill, we demand that our physician make use of the latest medical findings. When we are in the market for a new car, we demand a model that makes full use of technological research. When we are shopping for additions to our wardrobe, we ask for clothes made of new fabrics, fast drying and featherweight. We do not let up in our demands when we walk into the supermarket. We want frozen foods and mixes that save labor without sacrificing nutrition.

In the doctor's office, at the car dealer's, in stores and shops, we Americans clamor for the best that research can produce. But in our schools, what happens to our insistence on laboratory-tested practice? How firmly do we demand the best current knowledge? Where are the avid consumers of research?

True, we in education are becoming more sensitive to the need for serious curriculum study. Professional organizations are forming commissions and committees to encourage research. Planners of conferences and institutes are giving star billing to research methods. Writers are turning out articles, bulletins, and yearbooks to build bridges between the research laboratory and the classroom. But there is still an acute shortage of the kind of research that helps parents and teachers with the curriculum problems we are facing today.

We have all seen elaborate statements on problems that need investigation. We know that these declarations do not usually spur

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a breathless chase to the learning laboratory. Yet here we are drawing up another list. Why?

For several sound reasons. An inventory of questions that await serious study can give the busy educator perspective on his own problems. Such a list can point up problems that might profitably be probed by a team of specialists—sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, lawyers, economists. The list could help professional groups keep research attuned to current needs.

Before we draw up an agenda for researchers, we may well ask ourselves: "Curriculum research for what?" We need not argue the point that school practices are not always based on our best educational theory. No educator needs to be reminded, let alone convinced, that the gap between theory and practice is great indeed.

The past four decades have brought great strides in teacher education, great strides in our understanding of children, and dramatic changes in school facilities; but how much difference has research made in the kind of learning experience we offer boys and girls?

We do not have to search long or hard to find examples of outmoded practice. Forty years ago, one teacher with two years of normal-school preparation had her second-graders copy all the stanzas of a poem during regular writing class. The children could not read the poem; but this fact did not disconcert the teacher, who regarded the copying of the poem as an important "writing" activity. After the copies were in, she examined them, picked out those in the best handwriting, and mounted them on a burlap bulletin board. This was forty years ago.

Recently, in a community not far from New York City, a teacher with a Master's degree from a major university had her pupils copy all the stanzas of a poem. The copying of this poem, which the children could not read, occupied the class for several days. When the children had finished, the best samples of "good writing" were mounted on the new cork bulletin board.

What is new in the picture? The bulletin board. In forty years we have progressed from burlap to cork.

Researchers might take to heart the assertion of one writer that it is the function of educational research to help close the gap between theory and research, "to bring educational practice more clearly in line with educational theory" (4).

The search for the better schools we all want must center on the classroom, on the vital problems of working with children there. True, our schools are beset with transportation problems, lunch room problems, and problems of desegregation. True, we are faced with mounting enrolments, shifting population, and soaring school costs. But these tribulations take on meaning only as we consider their effect on the teacher's work with children.

I have a hunch that research in curriculum could shed much light on our current educational crisis, but only if researchers and school-men work together. Traxler recently observed: "There has been a tendency among researchers themselves to regard research as something carried on under carefully controlled conditions by specially trained personnel, after which, it has been thought, the results could be transmitted to school personnel for reference and use in their work. In other words, research has often appeared to be something done for education rather than as a part of education" (10).

Another educator extends the idea: "In the past research was primarily a function of the university. Today and in the future many important research programs will be shared by the university and the public school" (3).

What kind of studies are needed? What problems suggest gaps in our knowledge? How can research be related to school practice? These questions seem vastly important. The unfinished business in curriculum research described here grows out of impressions gathered from conversations with personnel from schools and colleges, participation in a variety of school surveys, and many visits to many schools.

Educators are talking a great deal about curriculum theory—that body of beliefs that give meaning and direction to curriculum development. The field is a confused one. We lack clear-cut statements.

We educators can deal effectively with the problems of curriculum-planning only as we have have a basic theory that gives meaning and direction to our work. We can set up meaningful goals and assess the work of our schools meaningfully only as curriculum theory is evident. Perhaps the time has come for teachers and curriculum workers to respond to critics of the schools with a logical, systematic statement of theory.

Curriculum-makers have explored various disciplines to shape theory, but it is no easy matter to combine education with philosophy, psychology, sociology, and medicine. Any comprehensive theory would have to take these disciplines into account, not to mention human relations, group process, child study, administration, and evaluation. Of course, any theory should be open to continuing question, clarification, and change.

How can we go about building a body of theory? One practical way is to build theory as we work, to observe our decisions and actions closely and identify the belief that prompts them.

This course was followed by a group of elementary-school teachers and principals in Ocean County, New Jersey. The group had decided to improve their program in language arts. As they worked, they sorted out beliefs on which their plans were based. These beliefs, the group discovered, turned on such questions as the following: What are children like? What goals should we set for children? How can the language arts contribute to those goals? What experiences can make these accomplishments possible? How can we evaluate our program? Within a few months, the group realized that they were working out an approach to language arts that could be used in any subject. Next year, this group will have a chance to test and extend the theory that they worked out together.

Any list of key words used in educational circles today would certainly include the word *needs*. It is generally assumed that teachers should begin their work by identifying students' needs. We expect statements of needs to be accompanied by objective evidence.

As more and more emphasis is placed on meeting students' needs, more attention will have to be given to techniques for identifying needs. Many teachers use informal procedures—unfinished sentences and stories—for this purpose. In recent years, many formal devices have been developed—general achievement tests, intelligence tests, pupil personality tests, the Mooney Problem Check List, the Wishing Well, and Self-Portrait N.

These developments are all to the good, but more research in this area is needed, especially on projective devices, problem inventories, attitude scales, sociometric procedures, and self-study of personality traits. Teachers need more sensitive instruments to identify children's concerns, interests, values, attitudes, feelings, purposes, and goals. Teachers need help in learning to use such tools more confidently, more effectively.

The steps I am suggesting would give us new information about the children we teach. But do we always make the most of the information we already have? Our schools need help in using data already available. Schools could used better record forms and better summary devices. Diagnostic problems might be less forbidding if faculties learned to share observations, interviews, and records. Many schools might benefit from research on how supervisors, principals, and special teachers can help the classroom teacher identify needs.

We can point to several studies that give a glimpse of what can be done in this area. One researcher has taken a close look at children's fears—fears connected with school. We need more studies like his and more techniques for identifying children's fears (9). Other researchers studying emotional needs in several schools discovered that many tenth-graders need to feel free from fear and free from guilt. Researchers studying values in a rural school in Tennessee found a marked difference between values held by girls and values held by boys. According to the Scale for Measuring Dominant Interests in Personality, the boys generally had high theoretical values and low religious values. The girls, on the contrary, had high religious values

and low social values. Such findings are important to curriculum-makers.

As long as we are raising questions, we may as well go the whole way. We have discussed at length the need for more sensitive instruments to diagnose needs. Perhaps we should probe the very assumption that children's needs must be diagnosed. What evidence do we have for this assumption? The assumption may be valid. Or it may not be. Do we have evidence one way or another?

If the facts persuade us that we must diagnose, we should, of course, do so, using the best instruments available. But we cannot stop at diagnosis; it is not enough to help curriculum workers identify students' needs. The basic job is to use the needs as a starting point for planning curriculums. Once we have discovered children's problems, we must offer learning experiences to help young people manage their problems.

It is no secret that we find it difficult to translate needs into school program. The step calls for skill and care. First there is the problem of determining the extent of the need, the dimensions of the difficulty. Then reasonable hypotheses must be set up for overcoming the need or problem. We need techniques. We need case studies. We need effective evaluation practices. Above all, we must recognize that no amount of investigation is likely to produce a formula for translating needs into program.

There is no lack of reports of school projects designed to meet children's needs. In general, these studies give attention both to the results of the projects and to the ways of working that led to the results. Perhaps one of the most widely recognized sources of help on ways of fulfilling needs is Rath and Burrell's *Do's and Dont's of the Needs Theory* (8). More studies like it are acutely needed.

More and more schoolmen are asking questions about the learning environment. What is the best environment for learning? How can the teacher create such an environment?

In a recent issue of the *Harvard Educational Review,* O. Hobart Mowrer reviewed and reinterpreted learning theory (7). Various writers, he said, have tried to develop a psychology of learning based on conditioning or on trial-and-error learning. It is important, he asserted, to develop theory based on both approaches.

This point raises an important question on the preparation of teachers. We have been trying to "teach" future teachers learning theory. Yet evidence is mounting that teachers and administrators need help with day-by-day problems of working with children. Teachers' practical problems need to be probed. We need more information on how to detect learning blocks, how to motivate, how to group, how to reward, how to promote. We still do not know enough about how children learn: we do not always know how to use what we already know about how children learn.

Not long ago a group of Juniors from New York University analyzed a battery of tests given to students in Simon Baruch Junior High School. The undergraduate researchers used the findings to formulate hypotheses about learning and blocks to learning. The project demonstrated the lively need to look into the question of how children learn, their difficulties in learning, and ways of removing obstacles.

What can we do to make teaching vital and meaningful to students? Here indeed is a question to look into. We make no claim for having discovered the problem. Nor shall we pretend that it is new, for it is not. Yet it is essential that we look at the question in terms of our own day.

Teaching is often a drab, lifeless performance. We dredge up the remote in time and place, completely ignoring local issues and current problems. Resources in our own neighborhood go neglected, and audio-visual aids gather dust.

How can we put vigor into the school program? Will it help to bring into the classroom something of the teeming life outside? Why are controversial issues taboo in many classrooms? Do we really know? Would it be worth our while to find out? Teaching should be

fresh, alive, of today. How can we link our teaching to topics that have a lively interest for students, topics that touch their life concerns? What do we know about motivation? Do the ad men study the subject more assiduously than we?

The problem may be closely linked with curriculum materials. The production of curriculum materials probably claims more energy than any other area of the curriculum. Materials are available in vast quantities. But how many of them are consistent with sound educational goals? How many of them vitalize teaching? A brief tour through the convention hall of the American Association of School Administrators can be a devastating experience for an educator who is seriously working toward the goals often professed by leaders in modern education.

We need research to give direction to the preparation of materials in local communities. How can children secure and produce materials about local government? About local history? About local problems? How can the city budget be used in the school program? What do we know about our local radio stations, television studios, community newspapers? How can we use these media to vitalize our teaching? What do we know about working with local clubs? How can we use the talents of individual citizens? How many communities could use information on how to develop and use an adequate library or museum?

Teachers in Grand Rapids, Michigan, have prepared materials about their city, its history, its peoples, and resources. In Atlanta and Milwaukee, teachers have engaged in similar projects. Ventures like these should be encouraged to develop local materials to vitalize teaching.

Today we are placing a new stress on creativity. We need to know more about creativity and its meaning for the curriculum. We have correlated academic subjects with art, music, and the dance. Now we need to correct the misconception that creativity is limited to certain fields. High schools desperately need to provide more opportunities for creative expression. Certainly, the methods that teachers use in

their classrooms should release creativity, not thwart it. Extensive case studies, demonstrations, and follow-up studies on ventures to foster creativity should be useful.

In Bronxville, a group of classroom teachers set out to improve their teaching. In the course of their search, they became more sensitive to art experiences, to movement, and to rhythms in working with children. As the teachers themselves became more free, more relaxed, and more at ease, the children also became more free and more relaxed, and the change was reflected in their creative work. What happened in these creative experiences found its way, in a very real sense, to other work in which the children engaged.

We hear a great deal about values as a vital area of the curriculum. Where are the curriculum plans that give students an opportunity for dynamic analysis of their values? Where are the studies to help teachers assess values? Where are the studies on methods of imparting values? This field is often divorced from children's day-by-day living. We need valuing that helps students with everyday problems.

In *Society and Education,* Robert J. Havighurst and Bernice Neugarten point out that values cannot be divorced from cultural patterns and social class (5). Yet these perceptive observers do not show us how the curriculum can be used to foster values.

Leda Amick made a study of the values of tenth-graders (1). For several months, she analyzed the values in themes that students wrote in English class. Through her study she glimpsed the wealth of information open to the teacher who listens to what students say and reads with sensitive understanding what they write. She learned how essential it is to know what young people cherish, love, and esteem.

It would be folly to say that all is well in evaluation, that new and improved tests are not needed: they are—in both elementary and high school. We need better tests in all areas of critical thinking—tests that require children, especially elementary-school children, to identify

sources of data, recognize assumptions, and reason logically in interpreting data.

Many schoolmen are very much interested in improved procedures for evaluating curriculums. Guides and techniques are needed to help faculties identify criteria for evaluating their schools.

True, we do have *Evaluative Criteria,* developed by the Committee for the Cooperative Study of Secondary School Standards of the American Council on Education. But these criteria seem to have little impact on continued improvement. Carefully planned studies could give us useful practices for evaluating a total school program from kindergarten through twelfth grade, practices that would encourage the improvement of curriculums.

The concept of system-wide evaluation, developed in the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, deserves study. In system-wide evaluation all schools in the system are appraised. Secondary schools are not evaluated in isolation from elementary schools. In the past, evaluations of secondary schools were often carried on at the expense of the elementary schools. Kenneth Kennedy has summarized system-wide evaluation carried on by a special committee of the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools (6). Here is a field that could benefit from research that is free from accreditation requirements, research that focuses on continued school improvement.

"Action research" has made many educators sensitive to curriculum study. We need not press the point that curriculum workers—teachers, that is—should carry on research as well as use it. Many school staffs are making thoughtful studies of their problems. In Norris, Tennessee, a school faculty is studying homework as a means of improving school practices (2). Teachers in Cedar Grove, New Jersey, are studying ways of improving children's manners. In Monmouth County, New Jersey, a group of elementary-school principals spent a

year exploring ways of improving their schools through more effective approaches to evaluation. It was exciting to hear a description of thirty approaches to school evaluation used by this group.

Major research findings on learning, leadership, philosophy, child study might profitably be translated into classroom practice. Hypotheses on factors that retard change may be imbedded in such studies. Why do school practices lag behind research findings? How can inertia and indifference be explained? How can we help curriculum workers become more efficient producers and consumers of research? Why is there so little co-operative planning? Why do we resist parent-teacher-student evaluation? Why do we still teach from textbooks? Why do we hesitate to call on the specialist? Answers to such questions based on solid study could give us more effective curriculum programs. As forces that impede change are understood, more ways to curriculum improvement will be opened.

We have saved till last one of the most pressing items of unfinished business. Can something be done to broadcast the need for a burst of enthusiasm in educational circles? How many of us have met teachers, principals, and administrators who are bored with teaching? Although many fine teachers are at work at all levels of our educational program, too many teachers seem to be bored. The zest that marked the era before World War II is gone. We have too much confusion and indifference. What can we do to infuse enthusiasm into our enterprise? Can someone help us see teaching as the great profession it really is—one of the most influential professions in the world, a profession where we enjoy the vast privilege of living with the future? If now and then we looked up from our desks to contemplate the magnificent scope of the teaching profession, perhaps our finest educational dreams could be realized.

We have by no means exhausted the possibilities for study. The "formal" researchers and the classroom teacher—that practitioner in

curriculum—could no doubt draw up a list at least as long as ours. For the researcher in search of a project, a visit to a nearby school, a talk with a nearby faculty, could open up many possibilities for study.

I am not urging anyone to investigate any problem listed here. I am urging that curriculum workers survey their school and their community and search out the problems awaiting study there. Our age demands a creative approach to teaching. The time is right for a speedup in curriculum research.

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Education, What For?

To the unwary, the question "Education, what for?" may suggest that we are free to choose educational aims according to whim. Nothing could be further from the truth. The very nature of the universe sets some limits. These, likely enough, we all accept; as a wag once observed, we'd better! The nature of human nature sets other limits, and these we sometimes disregard at our peril. The minimum conditions that will preserve a society—any society—set still further limits. And we have to recognize the limits set by the nature of a particular child who is fitting himself to live in a particular society.

If these limitations seem obvious, let us recall that it is only a few years since G. Brock Chisholm published "Can Man Survive?" In this article he proposed in essence that, since all mental ills stem from the moral certitudes inculcated in youth, we should cease teaching children about "values" (1). Apart from the probable impossibility of so teaching children at all, for want of possible teachers or methods, the upshot of following Dr. Chisholm's proposal would surely be no society (since society rests upon shared values) and hence, shortly, no children—or, at least, no human children. Dr. Chisholm's point may have been well taken psychologically, but more conditions than the psychological must be satisfied by an educational system, including some necessity to preserve the society that supports the educational system and nurtures, while it limits, the child.

The minimum condition for survival as an independent human being is coherence. The child moves—as he grows up or if he grows up—from the chaos of infancy, through the clamor of childhood and the confusion of adolescence, to the relative coherence of adult life. The fact that even adult coherence is partial and precarious does not detract from the point. Indeed, this melancholy recognition reinforces the point by informing us of what we already know: that few adults have been allowed to any sensible degree to grow up.

It is the business of education in the largest sense—all the child's learning experience—to achieve in him and help him achieve that coherence. It is the business of education in the narrower sense—the task of the school—to share that labor of love and life and learning appropriately with other social institutions, particularly the home, and with the child's own peer group.

But before the school can share in the task at all, there must be an understanding of what coherence involves. In its barest sense it means a belonging together in the same sense that the elements of a good picture or the notes of a satisfying chord or the themes of a great symphony belong together. A child, however, must cohere on many more levels than a picture. He has a body and a physical inheritance and a physical organization; he has a mind and an intellectual organization; he has feelings and an emotional organization; and, at any one moment, he has a set of attitudes or preferences and a moral organization. If he is coherent, if he is one and whole, his coherence is manifest, not only at each "level," but between levels, so that feeling informs thought and thought reforms feeling and neither outruns nor lags far behind physical capacity and skill. Moreover, since he has memory and foresight (which enable him to transcend time and contemplate the future—making tomorrow, by that act, different from what it otherwise would have been) his self of today must be in organic relation to the self of yesterday and to the likely self, or one of the likely selves, of tomorrow.

Since every child is in some sense unique and since that uniqueness

is the very principle of his unity and the very ground of his value, the notion of educating for coherence implies "recognizing individual differences," a phrase that puts the matter most ineptly. It is not difference, as such, that we should be interested in: it is uniqueness. When we express the matter in terms of "recognizing individual differences," we tend to be led off toward mass psychological testing of children, "typing" each one by a number (an intelligence quotient or sociometric score or what not) until finally he becomes virtually a statistic in a complex calculation of "how to manage a classroom." We have thus come, by way of individual differences, to depersonalization and mass management. A school organized on such principles may be a "reflection," but it is also, we hope, a caricature of the workaday world outside.

What is involved in approaching a child as a unique being is very difficult to put clearly. We have difficulty not because, in the ordinary sense, we do not know what we are talking about, but rather because, for many important things, our capacity to define analytically is often in inverse ratio to our genuine experience of them. Where we cannot define, however, we may help by pointing to what we have in mind.

Anyone who has profoundly loved or been loved will be aware of the direction in which the argument so far points. That in the beloved which evokes love is neither the undifferentiated clutter of behaviors and characteristics (which, in one sense, is "what she is") nor some teased-out set of "individual differences" (red hair, blue eyes, dimple, cute pout) that one could put on a list in a guidance department's file folder. What love homes in upon, without analysis and weighing, is the perceived or sensed or felt principle of coherence or pattern, the unifying principle that, for each person separately, makes him, in the most important sense, distinctively what he is. It is this ordering principle that constitutes his uniqueness; it is this that is the source of his value; and it is this that calls for, and calls out, "understanding" and appreciation—as against, say, knowledge about, or analysis of, the child's characteristics or differences. One might safely say that love

springs up only where such understanding furnishes the soil; that love is the seedbed for learning or any other creative activity. Good learning thus turns upon good teaching; good teaching, upon love; love, upon understanding; and understanding, on a set in the teacher toward discovering in and with the child his uniqueness, the basis of his unity or the pattern of his coherence—indeed, his inmost self.

So much for the matter from the child's side: his coherence as a unique human being should be the end or aim of his education. Indeed, the induction into coherence *is* his education, the only question being whether his schooling gives him one or not. If it does, he may "find himself" with the aid of the school; if not, the school may have served only to divert him from what, successful or not, must be his life's quest.

Just as there is a minimum condition for the survival of the person as a person, so there is a minimum condition for the survival of a society as a society. That condition is cohesion, also a principle of belonging together, but now as between people rather than within one person. It is just as easy—and twice as dangerous—to interpret the principle of needed social cohesion mechanically, so that it is held to mean that, to achieve "social solidarity," everyone must be taught or brought to think alike to a degree of particularity that would require a propaganda mill instead of a school to achieve and a totalitarian dictatorship to sustain.

But in our eagerness to throw out the totalitarian bath, there is every danger that we also toss out the democratic baby or, at least, the conditions for its survival, if one may mix a metaphor. It is necessary to the very notion of democracy, strange as it may sound, that everybody (or nearly everybody) think alike—in a limited number of vital respects. The emphasis must fall with about equal weight on two words: *limited* and *vital*. As we move away from the demand or expectation that persons must agree in only a limited number of ways, we move toward a blatant dictatorship of power or toward a more

subtle dictatorship of a conformist mass society. As we move away from vital—we could say vigorous, committed, dedicated—support for these few overarching universal agreements, democracy ceases to survive because its undoubted strains are not compensated by perceived and deeply felt rewards.

It is only when we take these views of the child and society together that the seeming conflict between the principles of coherence and cohesion, between the interests of person and group, of the one and the many, can be at all resolved. For it is only this kind of society that can give a place to the principle of coherence; and it is only on the basis of coherence that the kind of society that permits and encourages it—that requires limited but devoted agreement—can be duly appreciated.

If whatever we mean by that overworked word *democracy* has itself a unique and distinctive value as against other ways of life—and many of us passionately believe it has—that value lies precisely in this: What is to be valued in democracy is not a set of practices or forms— campaigns, ballots, parliaments, committees, debates—but its spirit. The spirit of democracy is manifest, from the side of the person, in its capacity to sustain, nurture, and value (not tolerate!)him in all his particularity. The genius of democracy, from the outsider's, or public, viewpoint lies in its capacity to prosper, the more its citizens are individualized, differentiated, and encouraged in the development and free expression of that which makes each a person, unique, irreplaceable, something quite other than an entry in somebody's "table of organization" or an item on someone's "list of personnel."

This is not the place to describe in great detail the nature of the limited agreement underlying a "democratic" society. Obviously, however, the consensus has to do with "the rules of the game" rather than with any particular outcome—indeed, more exactly, with the rules by which the rules of the game may be changed in such ways that the vitality of the game itself is preserved. Older children understand the idea and embody it readily in their play; only adult

political philosophers have difficulty with the thought. What makes it elusive—as elusive as the principle of coherence—is that democracy is so much more a matter of the spirit in which something is done than of the legalities by which it is explained that it is difficult to capture in words what most people, children included, can recognize when they see it.

If this view of education is accepted, we are led, I think, to a process as unlike the whim-ridden schooling of the twenties and thirties as anything can be. As any experienced teacher knows, the minute a child discovers (and the majority, it must be admitted, never do discover) that his education is a search or quest for himself and therefore for the limits of himself—in that moment an enterprise that was all sicklied o'er with the cast of unreality suddenly becomes vital, alive, "challenging," worthy of commitment. Suddenly we have a "student" and prospective colleague instead of a "pupil" and prospective sheep.

This set toward self-discovery also determines what is relevant and important, and justifies—if, and only if, it is genuine—the act of faith required of the young child, the beginning student, to make him study earnestly what at first must seem remote from his concerns but will finally be central. The value-orientation involved furnishes the only ground on which one may legitimately distinguish between "frills" and "fundamentals." The fundamentals are those activities and experiences that for this child—and for that one and that one—will most fully enable him to come into possession of himself as a member also of a society that will seek little more from him, except that he further the same quest in others. And education—as against, say, recreation—is the earnest pursuit of those fundamentals.

It hardly needs saying, perhaps, to so sophisticated a readership, that such views are neither an ideology to be thought about nor a sermon to be preached to the children (or the school staff) but a way of life to be embodied and exemplified in the school. Such

orientations—to self and others—are caught, not taught, and they cannot be caught except from those themselves so infected.

Here not all rests on the school, for the child learns a great deal more than he learns in school and, for better or for worse, a great that is different from what he learns in school. The school only damages itself by overestimating (or underestimating) its own importance vis-à-vis the home, by making itself a cultural factotum, or confusing its role with that of other institutions.

If the school does its share of the educational task, that should be sufficient and challenge enough for any institution! That share cannot be distinguished in a book or a short paper, let alone a sentence. But we shall be pointing in the right direction if we say that the school is most notably the custodian of the reality-system—as against, say, the wish-system—the mediator to the child of those realities and that realism that may in due time enable him to become what he and we now dream of his becoming.

This, I think, is our task.

NOTES

1. G. Brock Chisholm, "Can Man Survive?" *ETC.*, IV (Winter, 1947), 106–11. For a rejoinder, see John R. Seeley, "Can Man-in-Society Survive?" *ETC.*, V (Autumn, 1948), 38–42.

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Science, Society, and the Curriculum

I think of a curriculum as a constitution, a way of life for the intellectual and moral development of human beings under the aegis of the school. This conception has its origin in social philosophy, not in pedagogy. In this view, the goals that the curriculum sets are secondary, not primary. That is, the goals are secondary to the image that a people have of the kind of society they want and the qualities that human beings must have to bring that society to realization and to sustain and improve it.

Since the school is an educational, and not a political or "action," institution, its contribution to the kind of society we want can be made only through the human beings that it educates for the society we want. My image of the human beings we need is one of self-determining individuals associated with other self-determining individuals in a society dedicated to the maintenance and advance of self-determination—thus democratic human beings in a democratic order of human affairs.

My second image concerns the process by which human beings achieve a character. For to me, this achievement is the end-in-view of a general education. I think of this process as a transaction between an inner and an outer environment. The inner environment is made up of the needs, capabilities, talents, and potentials of individuals. The outer environment consists of the means and ends implicit in the resources of nature and culture: the physical world, human beings, and the material and non-material arrangements that they have fashioned for living together. The process of transaction

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is the way in which immature and unfinished selves become more mature and more complete, though never completed.

The inner environment, or self, is both the agent and the product of this transaction. That self emerges and grows in and through and by its transaction with the resources of nature and culture. In this sense, the process of education is self-education, not a process that one carries out alone and without the help of others, but a process that produces a self. The synthesis that education seeks to achieve is reported in the quality of selves that it produces. I think of this synthesis as resulting in coherence, which is the integrity of a human being represented in that balance and integration of mind and spirit that is characteristic of democratic man.

The curriculum is in balance when physical, social, and humane materials are in balance, or in their proper proportion, and their interrelations clearly established. My faith is that the complement to a balanced curriculum is a coherent human being. These are, so to speak, the intellectual and the human sides of the coin of education.

The transaction between an inner and an outer environment does not go on in a social vacuum, however. The transaction goes on in a society that manifests some quality of cohesion, or harmony, between its ideals and its practices. Needless to say, the quality of coherence that students achieve in school is conditioned by the quality of cohesion achieved by the society whose school it is. Balance in the curriculum is thus powerfully conditioned by the degree to which the "educative school" and the "educative society" work in harmony.

This harmony, I believe, is now seriously impaired. For the educative society is making demands on the educative school that bode ill for a proper balance between the physical, the social, and the humane components of the curriculum. One demand, perhaps more implied than clearly stated, is that the secondary schools produce forthwith, if not retroactively, an army of embryo scientists—mathematicians and physicists chiefly. In support of this threatening demand, the curriculum of the secondary schools of the Soviets is being held before us, either as the model in the image of which we should reform ours or as the one we must surpass. One or the other,

or both, are necessary if we are to increase our output of future scientists. So runs the argument—and the hysteria.

Criticism of this threat to our secondary-school curriculum does not gainsay that we are in great danger—how imminent, no one knows—of a hot war. But there is another danger, perhaps even more imminent. This is the danger that we shall weaken the bastion of our spirit by presuming to strengthen the bastion of our fists.

The argument that the curriculum of the Russian secondary school ought to be taken, in whole or in part, as a model for ours must be rejected on the ground that the curriculum of a given culture is not a fit item for export to another culture. This principle is quite as applicable to the exchange of curriculums between democratic cultures as it is to the exchange of curriculums between democratic and totalitarian cultures.

The argument that Russia begins the teaching of science in kindergarten, if such be the case, or that the Soviets hold school on Saturday, require double the homework that we do, and pay their teachers ten times what we do, moves me not a bit. If we fail to do these things, assuming that they are appropriate and necessary to our social and educational philosophy, I prefer to believe that we fail because we have fallen short of our own goals and needs, not that we have lagged behind standards to which the Russians hold. In other words, I prefer to improve our curriculum by pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps, not those of Ivan! If perchance something of profit to us may be learned from Russia's educational practices, let us make the most of it, not because the Russians follow these practices, but because we ought to in the service of ends, and by means, that are appropriate to our way of life.

Something—a very significant something—can be learned from Russia's educational practices. It is this: there is little evidence for the belief, held by not a few of our people, that the Soviets have launched a crash program for the production of future scientists and, in so doing, have sacrificed or materially impaired the balance between the physical, social, and humane studies.

The facts are quite to the contrary, not because the Russians are

angels, but because they are human beings. Whether we like the kind of human beings they are, is beside the point. Just as we are not motivated by facts, no matter how simon-pure they may be, neither are the Russians.

Dr. Glen Olds, president-elect of Springfield College in Massachusetts, writes with rare insight on this point in the *Saturday Review* of February 15, 1958, under the title, "Ideas: Man Is Not Primarily a Fact."

> Facts become pertinent to motivation when their meaning engages decisive human concern, whether for survival, power, curiosity, or service. The meaning may be manufactured more by dogma than discovery, and the motivation by fear or force rather than free choice, but both reveal the poverty of scientific facts alone to illumine—much less save—the human situation.

> We have naively thought that the secret to sudden Soviet power in science is science itself. Nothing could be further from the truth. Yet, like mad, we rush to mimic our mistaken notion of their methods, thereby perverting the opportunity to understand the secret of their power or of perfecting our own.

> Here lies the Soviet vitality: the sharp clarity with which they embrace their sustaining philosophy, and the dedication of faith that supports their value system and scientific success.

I have already indicated the criteria by which the balance in our curriculum should, in my judgment, be measured: physical, social, and humane materials in their proper proportion and with their interrelations clearly established. The interrelations of these three bodies of subject matter I believe to be the most important criterion; for it is the relation between science, symbolized by the natural-science studies, and society, symbolized by the social and humane studies, that will ultimately determine the balance in our curriculum. If the relation between these studies is established, the problem of their proportional share in the curriculum will be resolved.

For a moment, I shall waive the relation between science and society which requires that we examine the place of science in moral conduct. Instead, I shall concern myself first with the place of science in the physical studies—physics, chemistry, biology—and the many forms which mathematics takes. I am thinking now of what is called "pure science"—"pure" by virtue of its spirit or ethics, as well as its

techniques. In pure science, the rules of procedure are themselves moral principles. They demand, as my illustrious colleague Professor Frank Knight phrases it, tolerance, competence, and humility; and their opposite is fraud. These constitute the bench marks for thought and inquiry, no matter what the areas under investigation happen to be. Not to teach these bench marks would be a travesty on the liberal spirit.

My deep concern is this: Will the new and heavy emphasis on the teaching of science in our secondary schools make these moral principles clear? Or will they be forgotten? Will the spirit of science be taught as well as its techniques? If not, we shall produce not scientists, embryo though they must be, but gadgeteers! Will our boys and girls learn that the choice of the method of science is a moral choice? Will they be taught that dependence on science is an act of faith? Will they learn that science does not begin with something called "the facts" but with the excitement of imagination? Or call it, if you please, a sense of the mystery of all nature or, in Albert Einstein's phrase, "the holy curiosity of inquiry."

Will students learn that the scientific method is "hardly more than the native method of solving problems, a little clarified from prejudice and a little cultivated by training?" (1) Will they learn that formal modes of reasoning have little to do with the working of science but that discovery in the realm of science is made "through a series of intuitions, surmises, fancies" and that they must have the knack of knowing when they stub their toes on a truth? (1)

Will they learn that science is neutral and that there is no way of classifying knowledge into good and bad, safe and unsafe? Will they learn that they may rely on science and act on it, not without the chance of error, but without fear? Will they learn that science is not only a tool but also a guide—but that to which it guides lies not with science itself but with human concern and passion?

These questions, designed to treat science within the field, so-called, have not kept within that field. They could not, for science

is an integral part of our culture and both affects and is affected by it. Its neutrality is, after all, something of a myth.

But now, having crossed the bridge between science and society, let me inquire briefly into, and state perhaps somewhat more exactly, the nature of the relation of the physical-science studies to the social and humane studies. No thinker of our time has clarified this relationship with greater exactness and boldness than Lawrence K. Frank. He writes:

> It must be emphasized that we need more than abstract scientific laws, generalizations, quantitative findings, and formulas; we are waiting for a statement of the *meaning* of scientific knowledge in terms of its emotional significance for living, so that modern cosmology, astronomy, geology and biology will provide the equivalent of "Now I lay me down to sleep" in which the traditional cosmology, biology and psychology was expressed. More concretely, we must courageously and imaginatively recreate the four basic organizing conceptions essential to culture—the nature of the universe, man's place therein, his relations to his fellows and his society, and human nature and conduct—utilizing our recent scientific knowledge and understanding for that purpose just as our predecessors utilized the best contemporary knowledge and understandings available to them for constructing the culture they bequeathed to us [2].

Thus the physical does not occupy a realm detached, alien to, and apart from, the social. But this is not to suggest that there are not important differences between men and minerals, plants, and other animal forms. It is not their identity that is at issue, but their interrelations. Lawrence K. Frank's moral is this: physical things and the methods used to study them must be respected as indispensable means and conditions for social and moral achievement. It would, of course, be childish to confuse physical things taken as means with physical things taken as ends. But it would be equally childish to assume that social and moral achievements as ends can be had without resort to physical things and the tools of inquiry by which their order may not only be understood but also controlled in the service of man.

The relation between science and society was stated by Plato more than two thousand years ago. He made a distinction between *ariste* and *techne*. This is the distinction between virtue by whatever

name you choose to call it—justice, brotherhood, human dignity—and the techniques that are at hand for its realization. How virtue and techniques are related is the human problem in all cultures, times, and places.

In our society we relate the two in ways that are familiar to all of us, for the essence of the democratic faith is belief in the capacity of men to achieve the good life by rational and human means—by Plato's *techne* employed in the service of his *ariste*. Thus the rational symbolizes the scientific; and the humane, the social and moral—or call it spiritual if you wish.

However much science can help us make a better society, its methods are not those of the democratic process. The distinction is this: the democratic way of life will survive in this complex world of science only if a considerable proportion of the decisions that democratic people make are as right as science can make them. But decisions in a democracy are right only if freely arrived at, whatever the findings and verdict of science. In science, problems are resolved by the discovery of the order that is in nature and the use of that knowledge to control nature. In a democracy, the problems are those of policy, which are social and moral problems, and these are resolved, at least ideally, through full and free discussion among free men.

We need a more precise statement of the relation that science bears to ethics in human affairs, both within a man, as our concept of coherence implies, and between men, as our concept of cohesion implies. For this statement I turn to the German social philosopher, Max Weber. He distinguishes between the "ethic of conviction," what men believe in and hope for, and the "ethic of responsibility," what men do in the service of their beliefs and hopes. These are the modern parallels to Plato's *ariste* and *techne*—what we have faith in and how we arrange the physical, social, and humane environment so that our faith may, within the limits of men's rational capacity, be fulfilled.

These complementary views of what man has confronted, now confronts, and will continue to confront, provide the matrix within

which the method of science, which is the method of intelligence, may be used. There are many ways of writing the prescription for its use. I choose the following: the method of science tells us what means are, or are not, appropriate for the realization of our desires; it helps us criticize our desires by aiding our understanding of their practical meaning or, as the case may be, their utter uselessness; it permits us to examine the internal consistency of our desires and thus become aware of the "ultimate axioms" of our conduct; it informs us of the conditions necessary for the nurture and growth of our values and the consequences that will likely follow from acting to bring them to realization; and it helps us see what other values are served or dis-served by our choice of "this" value.

Thus science helps us determine what we may value, but it cannot make the judgments for us as to which values we ought to prefer. It mediates, but it does not rule. We act from faith, not from reason.

Mere passion or desire (to reduce the prime movers of man to but one) does not know the way. Moreover, there is not one path, but many paths, which desire may take. Nor is our problem rightly put if we say that "men must act." They do act! The question is whether they can afford to act from sheer desire, unaided by criticism, or whether they will discipline desire by criticism. Warm emotion and cool intelligence can, as John Dewey has told us, work together. It is our obligation as teachers of the social studies to know how they can and to teach the way to our students. Only then may they develop the insight and skill necessary to set limits on some of their preconceived values, if not indeed abandon some of them.

What about the humane studies? They have been, in one way or another, the object of my first and continuous concern. Science in its purest form is an integral part of our culture. How well integrated into our culture science is, is the problem. For science is the latest of the humanities—the works of man—and has not yet been assimilated to his ethics, which were the first humanities. My concern is that the cultural bearings and obligations of science be made clear. The social studies are the scientific humanities, but scientific in a limited sense compared to physics. It is from the record and the

problems of men, which are both social and humane in substance, that the social studies, viewed now in their scientific perspective, draw both the substance and the method of study.

There remain the arts, which alone are exempt from that form of criticism that we know as scientific. But this exemption is not complete. Our students must learn to master and use the canons of exactness appropriate to the many forms of art: drama, sculpture, music, painting, and the several forms of literature. Through the canons of exactness appropriate to each, we hope that appreciation of each will be enhanced.

Thus it is that humane values are, par excellence, the values that we derive from the humane studies. Their enhancement, and hence the enhancement of human life, is the chief business of the curriculum.

The curriculum, indeed human life itself, gets its unity through relating the interests, capacities, and talents of human beings; the knowledge and skills necessary for the survival of individuals and their culture; and the ideals, aims, and values of a civilization. If any one of these is off balance, the others are also.

The components of the curriculum at every level of general education must be the components of man himself. Reduced to two, these are loving and thinking. The balance and unity that must obtain between them, not only in the curriculum of the school, but in the structure of culture itself, have been described with conviction and beauty by the philosopher, William E. Hocking: "The new conscience is finding its courage because man's soul is recovering the sight of both its eyes. It is taking the scientific conscience into the house, not as master, but as partner" (3).

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Psychoanalysis and Curriculum Theory

Why, of all the behavioral sciences that might be selected, should psychoanalysis be chosen as a possible foundation for curriculum theory? The chief reason is that psychoanalysis has made a major breakthrough in our understanding of human nature.

It is interesting to note the positions that men of eminence have taken on Freud. In an address to the Division of Clinical Psychology of the American Psychological Association, the distinguished psychologist, Gardner Murphy, commented: "I believe that the insights of Freud, with reference to human motivation, impulse control, reality testing, and much else besides, are among the most profound ever vouchsafed to an investigator" (6).

Lord Adrian, neurophysiologist and Nobel prize winner, spoke on the one-hundredth anniversary of Freud's birth. Asked to name Freud's most significant contributions to human culture, Lord Adrian replied: "The greatest practical difference that Freud has made to our lives is that he has made it possible for us to understand so much more about the personal relationships we have, particularly those in the family. I am thinking now especially of the new ideas . . . about the attitude of children to parents and of the sort of factors that may lead young children to quarrel and behave badly and have tempers. . . . If we read any of the pre-Freudian books about bringing up children, or about difficulties between fathers and sons, or such like, the quarrels that they talk about are all on rather general issues—things like religion, or whether they should be independent, or future careers.

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... There is essentially nothing relating to sexual passion, or to uncertainty, or to the ideas which we now regard as the rather obvious causes. They saw children before others being naughty, because they were wicked or because they had not really anything much to do. The idea that they might be jealous of a rival or trying to get back their mother's affection . . . would have seemed silly and . . . quite improper. That is entirely changed, I think . . . and to produce what is almost a world wide change of that kind does mean that Freud, the theory of psychoanalysis, has had an enormous impact on what we think"(9).

Finally, Lionel Trilling in his concluding paragraph in his essay on Freud states:

Freud is quite at one with literature. In its essence literature is concerned with the self; and the particular concern of the literature of the last two centuries has been with the self in its standing quarrel with culture. We cannot mention the name of any great writer of the modern period whose work has not in some way, and usually in a passionate and explicit way, insisted on this quarrel, who has not expressed the bitterness of his discontent with civilization, who has not said that the self made greater legitimate demands than any culture would hope to satisfy. This intense conviction of the existence of the self apart from culture is, as culture well knows, its noblest and most generous achievement. At the present moment it must be thought of as a liberating idea without which our developing idea of a community is bound to defeat itself. We can speak of no greater praise of Freud than to say that he placed this idea at the very center of his thought [8].

Obviously, curriculum theory, which is basically and primarily concerned with man and his nature, could profit from an application of some of the most significant insights that have been developed about man. What are some of the significant concepts of psychoanalysis? How can these concepts be applied to curriculum theory?

To explain briefly and simply psychoanalytical concepts, which have not yet been definitively developed, is a difficult, if not impossible, task. However, this task must be undertaken before the concepts can be applied to the curriculum.

In this article the term *psychoanalysis* is used in three ways. First, it is a systematic body of facts about, and theories on, the develop-

ment of personality. Second, it is a therapeutic procedure. Third, it is a technical procedure for investigating mental processes. While some students would assert that psychoanalysis is also a philosophy, it is not so considered by this author and will not be so used in this article.

In considering psychoanalysis as a systematic theory of the development of personality, there are five concepts that may have value for curriculum theory. These are the concepts of the unconscious, of the instincts, of repression, of the structure of the mental apparatus, and of the development of personality.

According to psychoanalytic thought, man has two psychic systems, the conscious and the unconscious. Material that is in the unconscious is not known or attended to consciously. The influence of the unconscious on behavior is most commonly illustrated by slips of the tongue and forgetting. Let me cite an amusing illustration of the former. A well-known and brilliant educator was being introduced in glowing terms by the chairman of the program. The educator had been divorced and had recently married again—and he was an extremely attractive man. As the chairman closed her introduction, she said: "And I take much pleasure in presenting to you the much wed—oh! read—Mr. X."

The mental processes in the unconscious, the proponents of psychoanalysis point out, obey different laws than the conscious. The material in the unconscious includes contradictory impulses, many of them neither rational nor moral. This unconscious aspect of mental life is a powerful factor in determining our behavior.

A second psychoanalytic concept: man's instincts are, in one sense, the cause of all activity. Freud assumes the existence of only two, Eros and the Death instinct. These two instincts working with and against one another are the dynamics behind the development of our behavior and our civilization. As Freud states:

> In all that follows I take up the standpoint that the tendency to aggression is an innate, independent, instinctual disposition in man, and I come back now to the statement that it constitutes the most powerful obstacle to culture. . . . This

instinct of aggression is the derivative and main representative of the death instinct we have found alongside of Eros, sharing his rule over the earth. And now, it seems to me, the meaning of the evolution of culture is no longer a riddle to us. It must present to us the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instincts of life and the instincts of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of and so the evolution of civilization may be simply described as the struggle of the human species for existence [4].

Psychoanalysts believe that individuals use repression to exclude from consciousness material that is disturbing, that is, material that disrupts the balance and the esteem of the conscious self. For example, many teachers repress their hostile feelings. Consciously we think that we should not feel hostile—not if we are "good teachers." After all, "good teachers" love children, "good teachers" accept the child's behavior, "good teachers" do not get angry with students! Therefore, when we get angry, for whatever reason, we repress this anger and then deal with it in any number of ways. One common way is to set unusually high standards of attainment for students. We can in this way completely lose sight of our hostility and yet retain our own esteem. After all, high standards are desirable!

The structure of the mind, say the psychoanalysts, consists of the id, the ego, and the superego. The id is thought of as being made up originally of the inherited instinctual drives of the organism that are present at birth. As time passes, one part of the id, in its relationship to the external world, becomes the ego. The ego in one sense serves to regulate the energies of the id and the demands of the external world. As the child develops, the influence of parents and other adults shapes his behavior. Their prohibitions and standards function as the superego, which is commonly called the conscience.

The stages of personality development are commonly designated by psychoanalysts as the oral period, the anal period, the phallic period, the latency period, and the genital period. Erikson has suggested another way of viewing the development of personality. He lists eight components as essential to the development of a healthy personality. These eight components are a sense of basic trust, a sense

of autonomy, a sense of initiative, a sense of industry, a sense of identity, a sense of intimacy, a sense of parenthood, and a sense of integrity. In each of these eight stages there is a central problem that has to be solved, if only temporarily, if the child is to go on to the next stage with success. The relationship between Erikson's components and the Freudian periods of development merits attention. In this article, only the first five of Erikson's components concern us.

Trust, the first sense, is an attitude toward one's self and the world and is derived from experiences during the first year of life. This sense of trust is related to the oral period of development. At this stage the child lives with his mouth, which is of major importance. Experiences of being hungry, receiving food, and consequently being relieved and comfortable are essential. If this stage is satisfactorily completed, the child learns to trust others and to trust himself.

The second component, the sense of autonomy, develops during the second and third years of life. The significance of this stage lies in the development of the muscular system of the body. During this period, the muscles that "hold on" and "let go" are developed along with the muscles and skills used in walking, talking, and manipulating. This sense is related to the anal period of development. Mutual regulation goes on between adult and child so that self-control is developed without loss of self-esteem.

The third component of a healthy personality, the sense of initiative, develops during the fourth and fifth years of life. The child is on the go; vigorous and independent, he moves under his own power. This component is related to the phallic period. The child begins to see Mother and Father in a new way. The little boy sees Mother as someone he wishes to love and possess exclusively. Consequently he wishes and attempts to displace Father from the home, from the bedroom, more precisely, from the bed. As for the little girl, it is Father she wishes to possess. She is positive she can do better by Father than Mother does. These conflicts must be resolved, or the child is slated for difficulty. It is at this point that the conscience, or superego, is becoming established.

The fourth component, the sense of industry, develops during the sixth to twelfth years. According to Erikson, "the child wants to be shown how to get busy with something and how to be busy with others"(7). Children at this stage want play and fantasy, but they also want work and reality. The sense of industry is related to the latency period.

The fifth component of a healthy personality comes during the early adolescent years. The youth is determining who he is. He identifies with a number of people, occupations, and behaviors and eventually integrates all these separate identifications. This sense, along with the sixth sense, intimacy, and the seventh sense, parenthood, are related to the genital period of development.

In our consideration of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic procedure, three notions will be discussed: the aim of analysis, the role of the analyst, and transference.

The aim of analysis as therapy is to help the client to live happily and efficiently. This does not mean that the client must become a conformist, nor does it mean that the client must become an over-bearing individualist. Rather, in the words of Franz Alexander: "In a somewhat oversimplified form, psychoanalysis tries to help a person to remain an individual in a complex society and to express his individual inclinations on a realistic and socially constructive level by creative participation in the social process" (1). Also speaking of the aim of psychoanalysis, Bruner states that the patient "who is cured is the one who is now free enough of neurosis to decide intelligently about his own destiny" (3).

The role of the analyst is that of an objective, understanding, accepting, non-evaluating, trained adult whose purpose is to help the client recognize and understand himself. To the extent that the analyst is objective, understanding, accepting, non-evaluating, and trained, he is best able to be helpful to a client. Practically speaking, it is not possible for an analyst to always be objective, accepting, and understanding. For analysts, being human, are subject to their

own attitudes. Still, this fact does not negate the need or importance of these attributes. The analyst is able to be understanding and accepting presumably because his own analysis, which was required as part of his preparation, has brought about an understanding and acceptance of self. Besides analysis, the preparation of the analyst includes the study of basic psychoanalytic knowledge and the development of skills needed to understand the client's mental processes and transference reactions.

In transference, the client projects on the analyst his feelings, which may be positive as well as negative. The client may have warm and friendly feelings toward the analyst as well as cold and hostile feelings. These feelings are primarily a result of the client's personality and are not due to the analyst.

Transference is a pathological phenomenon; that is, the client reacts in ways that are not appropriate to the situation. His reactions stem from experiences with significant individuals—parents, siblings, and others—during his early formative years.

In our consideration of psychoanalysis as a technical procedure for investigating mental processes, two procedures only will concern us: the technique of free association and the technique of interpretation.

Free association, an introspective technique, is a "rule" accepted by the client, a rule that he is to tell everything that comes into his mind—thoughts, feelings, impulses. There is to be no censoring, no attempt to organize his reactions.

The material that the client presents by free association, his dreams, his transference reactions, give the analyst knowledge of his client. From this knowledge the analyst is able to construct what has happened, or is happening, to the client. The problem is to impart this knowledge to the client. This step is accomplished by the analyst's interpretation. Correct timing is extremely important in imparting the knowledge. If an interpretation is made too soon, the client may be overwhelmed and become anxious or hostile. On the other hand,

the client may have no reaction at all. A correctly timed interpretation draws such reactions as: "Oh, I see!" or "Yes, that's true." Sometimes the client simply nods in agreement. Usually the client will then recall more material and an easing of conflict will follow.

The analyst's interpretation results from his perceptions. Susan Isaacs illustrates the process clearly:

> For instance: a boy of five years of age, one day at a meal, addressing no one in particular, said in a very subdued way, "I don't like dreams: they are horrid things;" and then, after a pause, "and another thing—I don't have any."

> Now I find that every hearer, save the most obtuse, appreciates perceptually that in his denial the boy actually makes a positive statement, namely, that his dreams are so horrid that he wishes he did not have any, and cannot bear to remember them. The ordinary hearer does not set out his awareness of this in conceptual terms as analysts have learnt to do, using it as a means of generalizing the mechanism of denial; but everybody perceives the immediate concrete meaning. From such an example, which the man in the street can read, one may pass step by step to examples of words and behavior which yield their meaning only to the analysed, and the analytically trained; but there is no essential difference in the process of perceiving the unconscious mind through overt words and conduct, between such simple instances and those we deal with in the analytic hour. The difference lies in the degree of education. By his own analysis and his cumulative experience of others, the analyst is trained to perceive meanings which would be obscure to the untrained mind [5].

In this article curriculum theory is being limited to formulation of educational objectives, planning of learning experiences, and evaluation of the effectiveness of learning experiences.

The formulation of educational objectives is one of the most important problems in curriculum development. For, to the extent that the objectives are valid, the educational program has possibilities of being significant. The controversy over the basic purpose of the school is receiving a good deal of attention today. Should the school be developing the mind? Should the school be developing moral and spiritual values? Well-adjusted personalities? American citizens? Questions like these are being discussed and debated.

What light does psychoanalysis throw on the formulation of educational objectives? Both the aim of therapy and the stages of per-

sonality development can be helpful to us in setting up goals. It is interesting and yet surprising to note that psychoanalysis, which has been so concerned with emotional behavior, should have for its therapeutic aim the development of rational behavior, or behavior that is determined by intelligence. The fact that the analysts accept the aim of developing rational behavior may provide additional support for those teachers who have always accepted the role of the school as being primarily an intellectual one. But the fact may also stimulate those teachers who have not considered the role of the school as intellectual to reconsider the question. Certainly, if the analysts believe that the aim is worthy and possible to attain, the school ought to be willing to make the attempt.

Erikson's ideas on the stages of personality development have implications for objectives. Schooling in this country begins at about six years of age. Erikson's fourth component in the development of a healthy personality, the sense of industry or accomplishment, is especially important from ages six to twelve. These are the years when the school can and should emphasize knowledge and intellectual skills. These are the years when the child is ready and eager to learn the reading, writing, and other intellectual skills that adults use in the world of work.

This emphasis on the intellect, it is also important to note, is suggested for the adolescent years. In an article written some time ago, Bruno Bettelheim pointed out that the adolescent "lives in a continuous, anxiety-evoking dilemma—biologically, emotionally, and culturally" (2). Dr. Bettelheim goes on to suggest: "Since direct mastery of his problems is not open to the adolescent, the most adequate approach for him is mastery through thought. Understanding provides him with some relief from direct pressures, and thus he is no longer immediately overwhelmed by his conflicts. The adolescent can master his problems somehow through intellectualization, which, at the same time, gives him the prestige and strength of ego that he badly needs. . . . Thinking strengthens the adolescent's ego, while

action usually weakens it by defeat because he cannot yet act successfully with regard to his most pressing problems" (2).

If one accepts the idea that intellectual mastery is an important aim, the question arises: intellectual mastery of what? Bruno Bettelheim's article suggests subject matter that enables us to define the objectives more specifically. In the biological sphere, the adolescent should learn what motivates him, he should have the conviction that there is nothing evil or secret about sex; he should know the reasons for the need of prestige. In the emotional sphere, the adolescent should understand that a critical attitude toward parents is not an expression of the ingratitude of one individual but the problem of an age-group. In the cultural sphere, adolescents should understand that all job opportunities are not equally open to everyone; an analysis of available job opportunities would help adolescents understand that society is somewhat at fault.

Other analytic literature, even if it is not written directly for the classroom teacher, could be profitably studied as a source of objectives.

The planning of learning experiences is of crucial importance in curriculum development since it is through such experiences that learning occurs and educational objectives are achieved. Learning has been defined as a product of the interaction between the learner and his external conditions. This is a general statement. It might be more useful to say that what is learned depends on the learner's abilities, needs, skills, interests, attitudes, and perceptions as they interact with the external environment, which includes teacher, classmates, textbooks, ideas, films, filmstrips, and a host of other influences.

In the student-teacher relationship, an understanding of transference and the role of the analyst can be useful. Students project onto a teacher reactions that have developed before any contact with that teacher. Students may like, dislike, trust, hate, or love a teacher for reasons that have little or nothing to do with that particular teacher.

If the student projects warm, friendly feelings, the teacher is fortunate; for friendly feelings increase the likelihood of learning. It is helpful if the teacher knows that these first reactions are not under his control and that he is not responsible for them. These initial reactions of students can then be seen as evidence of how they perceive adults, including teachers.

The ideas underlying one aspect of the role of the analyst suggest that the teacher should be objective, understanding, and accepting of the learner's feelings, thoughts, and attitudes. The teacher should be able to accept the learner's hateful feelings, his worries, and his fears as well as his affectionate feelings. It should be made clear, however, that because the learner reacts to the teacher as if he were a love object, a mother, a brother, it does not follow that the teacher must respond accordingly. The teacher is to be reality-oriented as the analyst is, for the teacher is not a love object, not a mother, not a brother. However, the teacher should be able to accept these feelings. For, to the extent that the teacher is able to accept these feelings, thoughts, and attitudes, the learner feels free to develop. The learner senses that he is not so bad, that the teacher is on his side, and, very importantly, on that side of him that is trying to gain rational control over his impulses. Whether rational control is possible in all areas of behavior is highly questionable, but rational control may be possible in academic subject matter.

In the selection of instructional materials, the concepts of the unconscious, of man's instinctual nature, and of the analyst's role will be of service. These concepts may not provide solutions, but they may change our understanding of the educative process—if only to deepen our understanding of its complexity.

Some of the most important objectives that have been formulated for the schools involve attitudes and values. Yet educators are dismayed when they evaluate the effectiveness of their instructional materials for bringing about desired attitudes and values. For example, most courses that attempt to change prejudiced attitudes usually include learning experiences designed for this purpose. Stu-

dents read to obtain information about prejudiced groups. They take field trips to communities where the groups live. They read novels that take up the problems that a particular group encounters. They hear lectures and listen to talks exhorting them to treat all human beings with dignity and respect regardless of race, color, or creed. These instructional materials would seem to be effective. But are they? Some students acquire information, but their feelings and attitudes remain unchanged. Other students cannot even acquire information because of their attitudes. And some students have a change in attitude for the worse.

The assumption underlying these learning experiences is that man's conscious state determines his behavior and that when man is cognitively aware of the facts he will act as they indicate. All the experiences described here aim at man's conscious state. However, psychoanalysis emphasizes the importance of the unconscious in determining behavior. And, inasmuch as the material in the unconscious includes contradictory impulses, many of which are not rational or moral, our behavior will frequently be neither rational nor moral. While the learner knows that he is not to dislike or to feel a certain way toward another individual, he still feels and behaves that way —reading, lectures, and field trips notwithstanding. The learner feels and behaves in a certain way because of the impulses from the unconscious.

The school has at least two obvious alternatives. One is to relinquish the aim of changing attitudes. The other is to retain this aim and change our techniques for bringing it about. If we choose the latter, teachers must have, in addition to professional training for teaching academic material, the training of an analyst. Or we must add psychologists and analysts to our school staffs to work with students in changing their basic personality structure. My own choice, at this time, would be to forsake the aim because of practical considerations.

The concept of man's instinctual nature also has implications for us here. According to Freud, man has an innate disposition toward

aggression, which pushes for expression. If we accept the Freudian notion, aggression is here to stay, and the question becomes: to what extent and how can this aggression be minimized or channeled? If, for example, prejudice depends on the amount of personal aggression present, how can it be handled? Probably, at the very least, our instructional methods ought not to make learners feel guilty. If we increase guilt feelings, we shall probably only increase the amount of aggression originally present. At the most (and I doubt that many teachers are able to do so) the instructional methods ought, to some small extent, to reduce the amount of aggression present.

One aspect of the role of the analyst may have some implications for the teacher. The analyst knows that only as a client begins to accept and like himself will he be able to accept and like others. The client will accept and like himself when he feels that the therapist likes and accepts him. Therefore, teachers must be able to accept the learner's hates and fears. When the learner feels that he is fully accepted, he is able to be loving and accepting of others. At this point we must remember that, in working with a client, the analyst does more than accept his patient. The analyst has other professional skills that he also uses in therapy.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of the learning experiences is an essential step in the development of a curriculum. Through evaluation it is possible to determine where the curriculum is effective and where it is not. The findings may lead to a change in the aims or in the learning experiences.

At this point I should like to mention three contributions stemming from psychoanalysis: the free-association technique, the concept of transference, and the notion of the unconscious. As is well known, one of the most important functions of evaluation is to determine to what extent the learner's behavior has changed. To do this well, evaluation instruments must, of course, meet certain criteria, the most important of which is validity. Ultimately, all validation must go back to the concept of face validity. Briefly, *face validity* means that an instru-

ment is valid on the face of it because it samples directly the kind of behavior that is to be appraised. Usually, face validity is determined by analyzing the evaluation device, that is, by analyzing the items by introspection to note whether they actually seem to require what is to be measured.

The free-association technique is an admirable tool for appraising the face validity of an instrument. The technique has been used to determine the validity of instruments for the field of education. Students were asked to think aloud while they were taking the test. Their thoughts were recorded as expressed and then analyzed. To the extent that test items, constructed to require the ability to apply principles, actually required this ability, as revealed by the thought processes of students while taking the test, the items were valid. The objections to this method of validation are, of course, practical. The method is expensive and time-consuming. However, its value is obvious; if face-validity judgments of instruments are to be improved, the method should be used.

Another very important function of evaluation is to determine the students' strengths and weaknesses. Assuming that we have a test that has been carefully constructed, we still frequently encounter difficulties in obtaining an adequate estimate of the learner's abilities. Actually, the way the learner perceives the test determines the results that can be obtained from it. As we said earlier, transference is the projection of reactions that are not appropriate to a person or a situation. Students' anxieties are multitudinous: fear of being found out, fear of acquiring knowledge, fear of competing successfully with a rival. These anxieties are projected onto the test.

Here, too, the unconscious aids us in understanding extreme reactions that are frequently encountered by a classroom teacher. If, for example, a boy's fear of being found out is connected in his unconscious with his fear of not being so "good" as Father, the boy's anxiety will increase. As the anxiety increases, the surer we may be that the unconscious is contributing its share. The phenomenon of transference and the concept of the unconscious can also aid us in

understanding the student who is overly stimulated by examinations and prepares zealously for them. Here, too, the examination stands for more than it really is. For a girl, doing well on an examination may be a way of expressing her love for her father or of proving that she possesses attributes not traditionally ascribed to girls.

Several basic concepts of psychoanalysis and their implications for curriculum theory have been presented. It is probable that curriculum theory will be advanced as the relationship between psychoanalysis and curriculum theory is studied more carefully and discussed more critically.

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Justifying Curriculum Decisions

Decisions that confront educators are notoriously varied, complex, and far-reaching in importance, but none outweighs in difficulty or significance those decisions governing selection of content. In view of recent talk of "teaching children rather than subject matter," it is perhaps worth recalling that teaching is a triadic relation, describable by the form "*A* teaches *B* to *C*," where "*B*" names some content, disposition, skill, or subject. If it is true that no one teaches anything unless he teaches it to someone, it is no less true that no one teaches anybody unless he teaches him something.

We do not, moreover, consider it a matter of indifference or whim just what the educator chooses to teach. Some selections we judge better than others; some we deem positively intolerable. Nor are we content to discuss issues of selection as if they hinged on personal taste alone. We try to convince others; we present ordered arguments; we appeal to custom and principle; we point to relevant consequences and implicit commitments. In short, we consider decisions on educational content to be responsible or justifiable acts with public significance.

If these decisions are at once inescapable, important, and subject to rational critique, it is of interest to try to clarify the process of such critique, to state the rules we take to govern the justifying of curricular decisions. Such clarification is not to be confused with an attempt to justify this or that decision; rather, the aim is to make the grounds of decision explicit. Furthermore, clarification cannot be ac-

complished once and for all time but is rather to be seen as a continuing accompaniment to educational practice.

It is the task of clarification that I shall consider here. I shall offer an analysis of the process of justification along with suggestions for justifying decisions on curriculum.

What is subject to justification? A child may be asked to justify his tardiness, but he would never be asked to justify his cephalic index. Fiscal policies and choices of career are subject to justification, but typhoons and mountain ranges are not. Justifiability applies, it seems, only to controllable acts, or *moves,* as they will henceforth be called.

In this respect, justifiability is paralleled by the notion of responsibility, with which indeed it is intimately related. If I am held responsible for violating a traffic regulation, I expect to be subject to the demand that I justify my violation. Conversely, the child who is called on to justify his late arrival for dinner is being held responsible for his tardiness. The child may escape the need to justify his lateness by denying his responsibility for it. He can deny his responsibility by denying that his lateness was a move at all, by claiming that it could not be helped, was not deliberate or subject to his control.

Now that I have asserted that only moves are justifiable, I must immediately add one qualification. In ordinary discourse, we do not limit justifiability to moves. A city-planning group may debate the justifiability of a projected highway. However, the issue here can ultimately be construed as the justification of moves calculated to produce the highway in question. In general, ostensible reference to the justifiability of non-moves may be construed as a shorthand reference to the justifiability of moves appropriately related to non-moves. Where such moves are lacking, the justification of non-moves fails to arise as an issue. Thus, while we may speak of highways and courses of study as justifiable, we do not inquire into the justification

of comets or rainbows. Justifiability may, then, be taken as a universal property of moves; and those that are, in fact, justified comprise a subclass of moves with a certain authority in our conduct.

How are moves justified? If the justified moves represent a subclass of all moves, then to justify a particular move requires that we show it to be a member of this subclass. If no further specification of this subclass is given, we have a relative sense of justification.

Consider chess: we have a board and the standard pieces. We understand what constitutes a move, and we have rules that permit only certain moves. These rules, in effect, define a subclass of all moves. For a player to justify his move as a chess move requires that he show that it belongs to the chess subclass. Such justification is strictly limited, for it depends clearly on the set of rules that define chess. There are an indefinite number of other rule-sets singling out alternative subclasses of moves. A move justified for chess may not be justified for checkers and vice versa. A chess player justifying his move is not implying that chess is superior to checkers. He is only showing that his move conforms to the rules of chess. Hence we cannot speak, strictly, of a move on the board as justified in general or in the abstract; we have to specify also the operative rules.

Some processes of justification resemble the justification of moves in chess and in other formal games. These processes have a well-specified set of rules defining appropriate moves. Justification consists of showing that a move conforms to these rules, that is, belongs to the subclass singled out by them. There is no thought of justifying the set itself as against alternatives. Though it may not be explicitly stated, it is evident that moves are being justified only relative to this set. These conditions seem to apply when, for example, we consider Smith's driving on the right side of the road (in Massachusetts) to be justified. Driving on the right conforms to Massachusetts traffic rules. We are by no means claiming that these rules are unique or superior to alternative rules, for example, rules of countries where driving on the left is prescribed. What is involved

here is relative justification. Traffic regulations are, in an important sense, like chess rules or games in general. For one reason or another, we may be interested for the moment in playing a certain game or in seeing what the game demands in a particular case. But the existence of alternative games fails to upset us, nor is the comparative justification of the games as such in question.

Relative justification is not limited to such clear cases as traffic control. Much of our conduct falls within the range of less well-defined rules, or social practices and traditions. Much of the time, we justify this conduct simply by appeal to conformity with established practice. Nor should it be supposed that such justification is always as uncomplicated as that of our traffic illustration. Often a move is justified by appeal to a rule, and that rule by appeal to another. For example, Smith's right-hand driving may be justified by a demonstration of its conformity with Massachusetts law and this particular law by conformity with traditional legal practice throughout the United States. Though various levels are distinguishable, it is still true that the justification as a whole is here carried out in relation to American practice. That is, such practice sanctions a class of certain subclasses of moves, one subclass of which includes the move in question. In effect, one "game" is justified by showing its imbeddedness in another, larger "game."

The relative sense of justification is, however, not exhaustive of the types of justification that one used and, in itself, is hardly satisfactory for many purposes since every move is both justified and unjustified, in relation to appropriately chosen sets of rules. If I am not, as in a game, asking what move I ought to make in order to comply with some particular set of rules, but am asking what move I ought to make at all, the relative sense of justification will be of no help whatever. At best, it can lead me to another query of the same sort on a new level and leave me equally undecided there. The non-relative, or general, request for justification is, furthermore, one we often make or imply, and in the most important departments of life—belief, social relations, individual choices.

When we decide broad educational issues, we are often asking not merely what jibes with American practice, past or present, but what is generally justified, whether or not it is sanctioned by practice. The desire to evade this general question is understandable because it is difficult. But this evasion, I think, is responsible for much of the inadequacy of value-discussions in education. Two tendencies seem to develop. A move is defended on grounds of its conformity with American practice, and the question of the justification of this practice itself is not considered at all. Or it is flatly asserted that it is the duty of the teacher to conform to the educational practices of his society, an assertion which, besides calling on a non-relative notion of duty that is itself uncriticized, seems to many schoolmen to be far from obvious.

Both the nature of this general request for justification of acts or moves and the possibilities for dealing with it may be illuminated by comparison with belief. To know that a belief is justified in relation to certain evidence does not provide general justification unless we have confidence in the evidence to begin with. With this initial confidence or credibility, we can proceed to provide ground for our belief. Roughly speaking, what we seem to do is to justify beliefs that not only hang together logically but also, as a family, preserve this initial credibility to the highest degree. We judge belief in question by its general impact on all other beliefs we have some confidence in. No matter how confident we are of a particular belief, we may decide to give it up if it conflicts with enough other beliefs in which we have a higher degree of confidence.

In practical situations, of course, we do not actually take all our beliefs into account. We concern ourselves, rather, with a limited domain of beliefs that we feel are interdependent. Furthermore, we do not make piecemeal estimates of the impact of each belief on the credibility of the mass of our beliefs in this domain. Instead, we use summary rules of varying generality. These rules are quite different from the rules of chess, however. They are not simply chosen at will but mirror, in a systematic and manageable form, our

confidence in particular beliefs, classes of beliefs, and combinations of beliefs. Theoretically, there is no control (except perhaps that of the demand for consistency) over the design of games, no external requirements they need meet. The rules we use in general justification of belief are subject to the requirement that they be true to our credibilities on the whole. If a rule conflicts with our credibilities, it will be scrapped. We may say that rules are justified if they adequately reflect our credibilities by selecting those groups of beliefs that rank highest in this regard. A particular belief, then, is justified by its conformity with rules so justified. In effect, it is justified if it hangs together with that family of beliefs that as a whole commands our highest degree of confidence.

Formal logic as a code of valid inference provides an instructive example. People judged good and bad arguments long before the Aristotelian code. The latter was intended to systematize individual judgments and derives its authority from its adequacy as a systematization. When we now refer the justification of a particular inference to the ruling of Aristotle, our procedure depends on our confidence in this adequacy. It is a shorthand way of seeing whether or not the inference belongs with the mass of inferences we find most acceptable. Theoretically, no element in our procedure is free from future reappraisal. If, at some future time, we find that the existing code demands the abandonment of an inference that we value or the acceptance of an inference that we detest, we may alter the code. If an inference we are attached to conflicts with our code, we may give up the inference. There is a mutual adjustment of rules and instances toward selection of that family of instances that, as a whole, has the highest claim on our acceptance. An instance or rule that interferes with such selection is subject to rejection.

Codes of deductive or inductive logic may be construed as definitions of valid inference, not in the sense in which definitions may be used to introduce coined terms, but rather in the sense in which we set about defining a term already in common use, where this

use controls our definition. The man who invented Scrabble was defining the game in the first sense by laying down rules that were labeled "Scrabble Rules." On the other hand, if a man from Mars were to arrive in the midst of a Scrabble tournament, without benefit of prior study of the official rules, and were asked after some hours to define the game, his task would be considerably different from that of the inventor. He would have to observe, guess, and test, to determine whether his proposed list of defining rules actually squared with the moves of the players. He would be attempting a definition in the second sense.

Even this task would be simpler than that of defining valid inference or, indeed, of defining any term in general use. For our man from Mars could always, as a final resort, check his definition against the official rule book. But for valid inference as for other notions in general use there is no official rule book at all. We start by proposing a definition that will serve as a simplified guide to usage but continue to check our proposal against actual use. We justify a particular use of a term by appeal, not just to any definition, but to one that we feel is itself justified by adequate codification of usage. In effect, we justify a particular use by checking it, through adequate definitions, against all our other uses.

These examples illustrate what we may expect and what we may hope to accomplish in the general justification of moves. Justification in relation to a given set of rules is useless unless the latter are themselves justified. But further relative justification by reference to other sets of rules is fruitless. Somewhere there must be control of rule-sets by initial commitments to moves themselves. The rules we appeal to in justifying social moves are rules that we hope are themselves adequate codifications of our initial commitments. The rules we appeal to select those families of moves that, as wholes, command our acceptance to the highest degree. Without initial commitments there can be no general justification, any more than there can be real or controlled definition without initial usage. But

the fact that we are attached to a particular move does not mean that we cannot check it against all others we are committed to (by way of rules), any more than our attachment to a particular locution means that we cannot check it against others we hold proper (by way of controlled definitions). Our legal and moral rules serve, indeed, to guide the making of particular moves, but their guidance depends on their presumed adequacy in codifying our initial commitments to moves, on the whole.

In accordance with the two senses of justification just discussed, we may distinguish two levels of justification of educational decisions. On one level, justification involves conformity with a set of rules, reference to which may be implicitly understood. Here the issue is relative. We ask, "Is such and such decision justified according to rule-set S?" For many purposes, the question is legitimate and important, but the answer is often far from simple, even when the rules are fairly well defined. Relative justification is often a highly complicated, intellectually engaging business. To appreciate this fact, one need only recall that there is a whole profession (law) devoted to solving just such questions as the conformity of cases to rule. In education, such justification seems to relate not to specific laws but to broad social practices and traditions, the formulation of which has to be abstracted from our history and is itself a difficult job. Still, such traditions are often cited and used as a lever for changing laws as well as individual decisions.

Yet, legitimate as relative questions are, they do not exhaust our queries in educational contexts. We are not always interested merely in knowing that an educational move conforms to some code. We want to press the issue of deciding among codes. We ask that our moves be justified in terms of some justified code. If our previous analysis is correct, we are seeking justification by rules themselves controlled by the mass of our initial commitments. Of the two levels of justification in educational contexts, the relative type is familiar.

The practical issues here may be complicated, and one factor often adds to the complexity: ostensible questions of relative conformity to a given rule may be decided, partly at least, on independent moral grounds. Yet, many of these issues seem familiar in outline. The understanding of general justification presents a more formidable task, since the formulation of relevant rules is of the difficult variety illustrated by the attempt of the man from Mars to codify the rules of a game by watching the play. We need to do something of this sort, but far more complex, since the activity involved is our own and touches on our fundamental commitments.

What rules do we appeal to in general justification of educational decisions on content? The answer to this question consists of a set of rules, not assertions, but the process of compiling an adequate set of rules is as empirical a task as can be imagined. Definitions are not assertions; but to compile a set of definitions one needs to call on all sorts of information, hypotheses, hunches—and the resulting set is always subject to recall, if not to falsification. It is with such qualifications that I offer my list of rules relating to decisions on curriculum. This list should be construed as a hypothesis, tentatively offered and inviting criticism. If it proves wrong, the process of correcting it will itself help clarify the grounds of our curricular decisions.

To simplify our considerations, let us avoid, at least at the outset, the problem of formulating special, complicated rules for deciding on content to be taught at a particular time and in particular circumstances. Let us consider instead all the content to be learned by a child during his formal schooling. Without worrying, for the moment, about the functions of particular segments of this content, let us ask instead what we expect of the content as a whole. Let us, further, state our rules in terms broad enough to allow for practical judgment in applying them to cases.

The guiding principle underlying the following rules is that edu-

cational content is to help the learner attain maximum self-sufficiency as economically as possible.

Presumably, self-sufficiency can be brought about economically or extravagantly; content should be selected that is judged most economical. Three types of economy are relevant. First, content should be economical of teaching effort and resources. Second, content should be economical of learners' effort. If a very strenuous way and a very easy way of learning something are otherwise equal, this rule would have us select the easier course. Some such principle seems to figure often in educational discussion. For example, the linking of subject matter to children's interests is often defended on grounds that this technique facilitates learning, and even opponents of this aproach do not argue that these grounds are irrelevant. It is important, however, to specify that our rules all contain a tacit clause: "other things being equal." It may be argued, for example, that the strenuous course makes for perseverance and other desirable habits, as the easy course does not. Here, however, other things are not equal, and the present rule fails to apply. Criticism of extremism in progressive education, for instance, may be interpreted as insisting that the "interest" principle never stands alone but is always qualified by the clause "other things being equal." Once qualified, the rule stands, in my opinion. There is no positive virtue in unnecessarily taxing the learner; his energy may better be saved for other tasks.

Finally, we must consider economy of subject matter; content should have maximum generalizability or transfer value. The notion of generalizability is, however, ambiguous. Accordingly, two types of subject-matter economy need to be distinguished. First, is there an empirically ascertainable tendency for the learning of some content to facilitate other learning? Presumably, this sort of question was at issue in the controversy over classics, and it was discussed in terms of empirical studies. Second, is the content sufficiently central logically to apply to a wide range of problems? This is not a psychological question but one that concerns the structure of

available knowledge. Nevertheless, it is through some such principle of economy, in the logical sense, that we decide to teach physics rather than meteorology, for instance, where other considerations are balanced.

The most economical of content in all the aspects described must still meet the requirements of facilitating maximum self-sufficiency. It should be obvious that we do not necessarily, or ever, apply first the rules of economy and then the rules of self-sufficiency. These rules represent, rather, various requirements put on content, and we may apply them in various orders or simultaneously. We turn now to the rules of self-sufficiency.

Content should enable the learner to make responsible personal and moral decisions. Self-awareness, imaginative weighing of alternative courses of action, understanding of other people's choices and ways of life, decisiveness without rigidity, emancipation from stereotyped ways of thinking and perceiving—all these are bound up with the goal of personal and moral self-sufficiency. The problem of relating school subjects to such traits is an empirical one, but I think it extremely unlikely that a solution is to be found in the mechanical correlation of each subject to some one desired trait. Rather, the individual potentialities of each subject are likely to embrace many desired habits of mind. The use of literature to develop empathy is often noted. But to suppose that this function is restricted to literature is to impoverish our view of the potentialities of other subjects. Anthropology, history, and the other human sciences also offer opportunities to empathize. But even the natural sciences and mathematics may be seen not merely as technical equipment but as rich fields for the exercise of imagination, intuition, criticism, and independent judgment.

The making of responsible personal and moral decisions requires certain traits of character and habits of mind, but such decision-making also requires reliable knowledge, embodied in several areas of study. Psychology, anthropology, and other human studies illumine personal choice; history, political science, economics, soci-

ology and related areas illumine the social background of choices of career and ideology.

We have spoken of personal and moral self-sufficiency, but this is not enough. Since personal and moral decisions are not made in a vacuum, their execution requires technical skills of various sorts. Content should thus provide students with the technical or instrumental prerequisites for carrying out their decisions. What this goal may require in practice will vary from situation to situation; but, speaking generally, mathematics, languages, and the sciences are, I believe, indispensable subjects, while critical ability, personal security, and independent power of judgment in the light of evidence are traits of instrumental value in the pursuit of any ends. In creating curriculums, the notion of technical or instrumental self-sufficiency provides a counterbalance to emphases on the child's interest. For subjects unsupported by student interest may yet have high instrumental value for the students themselves. To avoid teaching them such subjects is, in the long run, to hamper their own future self-sufficiency, no matter what their future aims may be. Thus, it is misleading to label as an imposition of adult values the teaching of instrumentally valuable subjects.

Finally, beyond the power to make and to carry out decisions, self-sufficiency requires intellectual power. Content, that is, should provide theoretical sophistication to whatever degree possible. Here we may distinguish between logical, linguistic, and critical proficiency—the ability to formulate and appraise arguments in various domains, on the one hand, and acquaintance with basic information as well as with different modes of experience and perception, on the other. The danger here, a serious risk of general education programs, is that of superficiality. But ignorance is also a danger. How to avoid both ignorance and superficiality is the basic practical problem. I should hazard the opinion that the solution lies not in rapid survey courses but in the intensive cultivation of a small but significant variety of areas.

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Research and the School System as an Organization

To serve the educational needs of a community demands effort. To be effective, effort requires organization, or a structure through which individual energies may be channeled. Organized effort gives rise to the need for a division of labor, or the distribution of functions and activities among departments and subdivisions of departments. Division of labor makes it necessary to fix responsibility, and this requirement makes a hierarchy of authority indispensable.

The last two elements, division of labor and the hierarchy of authority, have a far-reaching influence on an organization. They reinforce the belief that some duties are more important to the organization than others. They are linked with the formal and informal assignment of status and accompanying prerogatives. And they serve as the mainspring of the desire for promotion and transfer within the organization.

Differences in the way individuals perceive function and status and opportunity for promotion create groups that lose their perspective on their place in the organization, intensify the problem of co-ordinating actions of groups, and lessen the potential for co-operation. Marked differences give rise to actions tending toward subversion of the organization (1).

If an organization is to achieve its predetermined goals, individuals and groups must work together with a minimum of detrimental conflict. However, they must work in a setting, the very

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nature of which breeds conflict. This built-in problem of organization may be summed up briefly: to be effective, effort demands organization, but organization tends to thwart co-operative effort because of the presence of the indispensable division of labor and hierarchy of authority.

The built-in problem of organization in school systems has not gone unrecognized. Concern has often taken the form of verifying the existence of the problem through surveys. Conducted for the most part under the Kellogg Foundation Program, the keynote of the surveys is sounded in the title of one report: "Relation with People Is the Key" (2). The problem has also stimulated theoretical proposals regarding school administration (3). Many of the suggestions stress the crucial importance of understanding systems of interaction.

These surveys and proposals on school organization come at a time when several developments are adding to organizational problems. One such development is the expansion of school districts as a result of increased enrolments, urbanization, and consolidation. The trend toward larger school districts has been accompanied by greater bureaucratization and greater division of labor (4).

As the schools have broadened their aims, new features have been added to the school program. These, in turn, have added to the problems of organization. The changes have not only increased the division of labor within the school systems; they have also brought into the organization people of widely varying backgrounds, points of view, and orientation. It has now become clearer than ever that various groups in the schools hold differing and sometimes conflicting views of the goals of the organization (5). In schools where such changes are taking place, teachers may wonder whether they are on the staff of a school or a recreation center. They may ask who runs the school, the music department or the principal. They may protest that counselors are not helpful because they have lost contact with the problems of working with students in the classroom.

The necessity for understanding working relationships between adults in school systems is generally recognized. The importance of the quality of these relationships to the effectiveness of the school system is also usually acknowledged. Still, educational researchers have generally neglected the study of relevant aspects of organizational structure. The fact is, many educational researchers and administrators do not see the school system as an organization. Some still cling to the notion that to understand the work performed in an organization is to understand the organization. Investigation supports the position that the structure of an organization lies not in the work performed but in the stable patterns of interaction among persons performing the work. As Drucker wrote: "An institution is like a tune, it is not constituted by individual sounds but by the relations between them" (6).

Educational administrators are learning that one of their main tasks is to bridle detrimental conflict within the organization and to provide for compatible behavior among groups and individual members of the organization. To learn to cope adequately with the ever growing problems, students of educational administration will have to turn away from the investigation of such traditional subjects as efficient maintenance programs or the characteristics of the "good" administrator or the administrator's use of his time. Subjects like these will have to give way to study of social systems of schools and organizational forces affecting behavior.

To enhance understanding of organizational forces that influence behavior, and thus organizational behavior itself, the educational administrator must give attention to three lines of thought. First, he must develop a more realistic background for studying organization; he must move to a new construct. Next, he must seek out directions that the study of organizational forces on behavior might follow; he must become aware of the elements in the structure of an organization, the formal and informal forces shaping organiza-

tional behavior. Finally, the researcher in educational administration must be willing to question his traditional research patterns.

To aid the researcher in educational administration toward more meaningful research on organizational structure and behavior, several suggestions along these three lines of thought follow.

The school as an organization may be seen as a social system with a specific structure and function. It is an open system, that is, it interlocks with, and is imbedded in, other social systems. Its structure and function cannot be fully understood apart from these other systems.

But school organization can also be regarded as an entity, a society in miniature, with its own culture, created and maintained by the entities of the organization that constantly affect the culture. The reverse is also true. The culture, as it is maintained by the members of the organization, molds the character of the organization. Each acts on the other.

The social system of an organization embodies many smaller systems—systems centered on status, role, authority, responsibility, communication, and other factors. These smaller systems are continually interacting with one another, and in certain ways they are interrelated. It is the interrelation of these systems, their continual influence on one another, that makes them "dynamic."

The nature of organizational structure calls for analysis of two major elements, the formal and the informal. The formal element is represented by behavior that is structured by the fact of organization and influenced by formal rules, regulations, policies, and fixed arrangements. This behavior is shaped by the scheme developed by management as the official way of getting work done. Researchers analyzing at this level examine controls conceived and operated by management to achieve compatible behavior.

Much behavior in organizations is not directly shaped by formal rules and regulations. For lack of a better term, this behavior may be described as informal. This behavior is structured in that the formal rules and regulations are sometimes conflicting and inevitably inadequate. Also it is usually designed to enhance the importance

of the individual in the organization. In a real sense, this behavior is shaped by the employees' attempts to adapt to the formal requirements of the organization and to modify formal requirements to personal needs.

In using the two levels of analysis, one fact must be kept in mind: at both the formal level and the informal, personal and social components are at work. Much behavior in an organizational group is personal, related to the individual differences and idiosyncrasies of members of the group. And much behavior is social, in conformance to "norms" and "persistent interaction patterns" that flatten out personal differences and remain relatively stable in spite of changes of actors in the organizational group. Analysis of behavior on both formal and informal levels must take into account social and personal components. These levels of analysis are not mutually exclusive. Actually, they are inseparable, representing different points of departure into the same general territory.

A perspective of organization such as that suggested above leads the way to a framework for the study of organization. Since a framework is only a study tool, it should constantly be questioned and tested to see whether the available information fits. A framework is not a series of receptacles for the ordering of data regardless of fit. Used in this way, a framework can be a hindrance. With these cautions in mind, we shall suggest a framework that may be used for research on organizational structure and behavior.

Organization is the structured interaction of the participants which, because of the interrelatedness of its parts and its dynamic quality, can best be viewed as a social system. The crucial elements of the social system of an organization reveal themselves on examination of the controls on behavior in the organizational setting.

The structured interaction patterns that make up the organization can be accounted for partly by explicit attempts of management to control behavior through such mediums as leadership; supervision; communication practices; prescribed rules, regulations, and policies; methods of division of labor and assignment of authority that result

in formal statuses, roles, and centers of decision-making powers; and methods of distribution of responsibility and attendant systems of span of control.

Explicit controls of behavior in organizations do not operate alone but in connection with other forms of control. Implicit controls develop from daily contacts of the workers, both in management and among the rank and file. Implicit controls are not conceived by management but are largely the product of small group interaction and may aid, hinder, or act as a neutral agent in the operation of the organization. Implicit controls, growing as they do from groups, explain much behavior that is not formally required but is still a vital part of the organization. These controls take such forms as unsanctioned practices in the performance of work, an extreme example of which might be restriction of output. Informal controls may show up as informal status, which carries leadership prerogatives though it does not necessarily conform to the formal assignment of status in terms of division of labor and the hierarchy of authority. Implicit controls may take various other forms: informal rules that grow out of faulty formal structure or attempts to meet individual or group needs and characteristics; non-delegated centers of decision-making power; and sentiments and attitudes.

Implicit controls may be more important to an organization than explicit controls, especially when an element of professionalism is assumed for each group carrying out the work. By definition, professionalism and autonomy for work groups go together. Autonomy for work groups makes clear the greater role of implicit controls. With autonomy, more of the organizational burden rests with the individuals, owing to the assumed characteristics of professionals. Certainly, implicit controls are more readily enforced and harder to escape. At the same time, the penalties and rewards are more meaningful to the individual.

In the presence of these controls, internal interest groups develop. These groups owe their existence to the irrevocable division of labor and to the common sentiments and attitudes that can be developed in the group set apart by the division of labor. The division of labor

gives the group identity and offers a "cause," and the development of sentiments and attitudes gives the ability and energy to act. Thus, internal interest groups are significant and sometimes determining forces in organizations. As forces, they may be dormant or active, and they may be active in a positive or negative way from the view of the organization.

Besides explicit and implicit controls on behavior, organizations also have an externally imposed control system, which is made up of controls imported into the organizations from the larger social system outside the organization.

In addition to reassessing his view of the nature of organization and considering directions that inquiries into behavior in organization might take, the educational administrator and researcher must entertain some questions about his customary patterns in the conduct of research. Consideration should be given to two basic approaches in the study of organizations: the use of a conceptual scheme for the study of an entire organization and the use of specific questions in the study of aspects of an organization that have been momentarily isolated from the whole.

Three conceptual schemes that have been used in the study of the whole of an organization seem to be extremely helpful. Because they stem from the work of anthropologists and sociologists, the schemes overlap considerably.

The concept of "institution" developed by Bronislaw Malinowski proved an effective guide in the study of organization made by John S. Ellsworth (7). These six elements were considered characteristic of an institution in action: charter, personnel, norms and rules, material apparatus, activities, and function. Analysis of these elements, their relationships, and the basic concept involved yielded a portrait of an organization well worth careful consideration by those concerned with methods of research.

Peter Blau used the scheme of "functional analysis" in his study of organization. The chief elements of the scheme were function, that is, the consequence of a given practice and its significance for the organization; mechanisms and processes through which the prac-

tice is effected; unexpected consequences of the practice important to the functioning of the organization; and dysfunctions, or those observed consequences of a practice that lessen adaptation or function of the organization (8).

Philip Selznick used a similar scheme developed from the same sources. He added a meaningful point for analysis, the concept of co-optation, "the process of absorbing new elements into leadership or policy-determining structures of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence" (9).

Another approach for researchers is to examine one aspect of organization against the background of the entire organization. Instead of a scheme of analysis, this approach uses predetermined questions and predetermined procedures for gathering data.

The well-formulated question is the key to a good study of an isolated bit of behavior in an organization. In this sense, research procedures might be thought of as secondary in importance. With a well-formulated question, errors in research may be made, but the possibility of significant findings still remains. On the other hand, if the problem demonstrates little understanding and insight, even the best research procedures may fail to produce meaningful findings.

It is not easy to develop a significant problem. To do so requires familiarity with the subject and the careful consideration of many questions. Examples of meaningful problems in the study of organizations may be found in the works of Bendix (10) and Francis and Stone (11). These studies of bureaucracy are cited here because they deal with similar phenomena.

Another important question the researcher faces is the method of gathering data. Educational administrators are prone to use only one method and one source. The practice is unwise because of the interrelatedness characteristic of organizations.

To be significant, the study of organizational structure demands that the researcher use a variety of sources and a variety of methods of gathering data. Still, data should not be gathered haphazardly. The methods should fit the purpose for which the information is to be used.

Because so little is known of organizational structure, we are not yet ready for normative studies. At present it would be well to consider eliminating the basic tool of the educational administrator: the broadcast questionnaire. The questionnaire assumes that the user knows the character of the answers and the possible ranges. Questionnaires should be used chiefly to determine the distribution of answers among a given population. At present a distribution of answers would not be meaningful, since our knowledge of the social systems of educational organizations is not at a point where we know the fruitful questions. Exploratory and probing studies are needed.

Another question that faces the researcher is the selection of informants. Here standard practices must be reassessed. When researchers are working in uncharted areas, is it best to ask directions of a statistically randomly selected informant or is it wiser to select an informant who "knows the way"? Since the purpose is to gain insight and understanding, the educational administrator who is studying organizational structure and behavior may well seek out individuals who are close to the problem, individuals who can and will talk about it with clarity and insight. This measure will be more useful than strict adherence to a random selection of informants in the hope that a few qualified informants will be included. True, there is a need for exploratory studies, but this is not to deny that the need will arise to check the distribution of a phenomenon in which random sampling for interviews seems appropriate.

The researcher must get closer than arm's length, closer than the mail box, to his subject. Research techniques like participant observation should be considered. Such techniques place greater demands on the researcher, but the returns are also greater. These techniques require an understanding of the role of the researcher. He will have to recognize the paradox of observing as a detached observer and at the same trying to cultivate intimate relationships to stimulate the free flow of data. In the study of social organizations, these qualifications are musts.

The preceding remarks have been intended as suggestions to educational administrators and researchers for the study of organizational

structure and behavior. The area of concern is truly pertinent, for, by and large, educational administrators have not acted as if they were sensitized to the importance of the study of the structure of the organization through which they attempt to provide an effective educational program. Educational administrators fail at their task to the extent that they do not recognize that some of the basic administrative difficulties are tied to the social system and structure of the organization. These schoolmen fail also to the extent that they leave unused the theory and research made available by related disciplines active in the study of purposive organization.

NOTES

1. Robert Michels has pointed out that division of labor contributes directly to subversion of the aims of an organization by encouraging oligarchic rule. See his famous "iron law of oligarchy" in *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949). Subverting influences of school leaders have been noted. Teachers often protest that a particular program is supported in a way detrimental to other programs (thought to be equally or more important) because the superintendent or some other influential official has a special interest in the program.

2. For the results of some of these surveys, see: J. S. Benben, "Whither School Administration," *Administrator's Notebook,* I (January, 1953), 1–4; A. P. Coladarci *et al.,* "Research Priorities in Educational Administration," *Journal of Educational Research,* XLVII (April, 1954), 625–30; Cooperative Program in Educational Administration, "Results of Action Research in Educational Administration," *School Executive,* LXXIII (November, 1953), 67–69; and G. E. Flower *et al.,* "Relation with People Is the Key," *American School Board Journal,* CXXIV (June, 1952), 25–27.

3. The following articles contain such proposals: J. W. Getzels, "A Psycho-Sociological Framework for the Study of Educational Administration," *Harvard Educational Review,* XXII (Fall, 1952), 235–46; F. G. Cornell *et al.,* "Administrative Organization as Social Structure," *Progressive Education,* XXX (November, 1953), 29–35; F. G. Cornell, "Socially Perceptive Administration," *Phi Delta Kappan,* XXXVI (March, 1955), 219–23; R. Conrad, "A Sociological Approach to Public School Administration," *Educational Administration and Supervision,* XXXVIII (November, 1952), 285–92.

4. Writing of the schools of Middletown, the Lynds observed: "In 1890 the only person in the entire school system who did not teach was the superintendent, while today there is a galaxy of principals, assistant principals, supervisors of special subjects, directors of vocational education and home economics, deans, attendance officers, and clerks, who do no teaching but are concerned in one way or another with keeping the system going. . . . Thus, in personnel as well as in textbooks and courses of study, strains or maladjustments in education are

being met by further elaboration and standardization" (Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrill Lynd, *Middletown* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929], p. 210). The many other new positions, such as school psychologist, added to school systems since the first Middletown study, need not be listed here.

A recent study has produced evidence on the relation between bureaucratization and the size of the school district. The study tested the theory that the "relationship between the size of an administrative component and the total size of its containing organization is such that the larger the size of the containing organization the greater will be the proportion given over to its administrative component." In California, the theory proved sound for all types of school systems. As an example, the proportion of employees in administrative posts rose from 11.4 per cent of the total number of employees to 17.6 per cent, as the high-school districts moved through the range from small to large. See F. W. Terrien and D. L. Mills, "The Effect of Changing Size upon the Internal Structure of Organizations," *American Sociological Review*, XX (February, 1955), 11–13.

5. This problem of conflicting views wherein people whose training predisposes them to look at the function of an organization from different perspectives is not common in schools alone. However, in general, it is a problem that has not come under the scrutiny of educational researchers. For one example of the problem in a school system, see Richard O. Carlson, "Who Speaks the Boardman's Language?" *American School Board Journal*, CXXXIV (March, 1957), 34–36. Here the conflicting views of the superintendent and business manager were analyzed within a framework of their career types and the situational factors bearing on their relation to the school board. For an analysis of conflicting views in another but similar organizational setting, see Harvey Powelson and Reinhard Bendix, "Psychiatry in Prison," *Psychiatry*, XIV (February, 1951), 73–86. Through this penetrating study, researchers came to the conclusion, subtly implied in the title, that when psychiatric service is offered in prison, psychiatry itself is in prison. Psychiatrists and representatives of the prison custodial division hold conflicting views toward the problems of the prisoners: therapy is held captive by this conflict.

6. Peter F. Drucker, *Concept of the Corporation* (New York: John Day Co., 1946), p. 26.

7. John S. Ellsworth, *Factory Folkways* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).

8. For extended treatment of functional analysis, see: Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); and Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949).

9. Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953).

10. Reinhard Bendix, *Higher Civil Servants in American Society* (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1949).

11. Roy G. Francis and Robert C. Stone, *Service and Procedure in Bureaucracy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956).

University of Chicago Dinner at Atlantic City

The Department of Education of the University of Chicago will again hold a dinner for alumni, former students, and friends during the annual convention of the American Association of School Administrators, scheduled to meet in Atlantic City, February 14 through 18, 1959. The dinner will be held on Monday evening, February 16, in the Ozone Room of the Hotel Dennis.

The event will give those who attend an opportunity to renew acquaintances and to meet members of the faculty who plan to be present. The dinner will also provide an occasion for the faculty to describe new developments in the Department. Those who plan to attend the dinner are urged to make reservations in advance. For further information, write Harold A. Anderson, Department of Education, University of Chicago, 5835 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

The Department of Education will again maintain headquarters throughout the convention in Rooms 2 and 4 of the Hotel Dennis. Alumni, former students, and friends are most cordially invited to visit the headquarters. A representative of the Department's Committee on Appointments will be available to discuss placement and personnel needs.

The Sniper's Nest

Teachers are perennially being ground between some upper and nether millstones—between parents and students, between their meager salaries and increasing expenses, between allowing freedom and maintaining discipline, and a host of other conflicting poles or forces. Some recent personal experiences have brought sharply to my attention another set of contraries between which teachers are finding at best an uneasy peace. These are nature, on the one hand, and the machine, on the other.

To say that modern man has become alienated from nature is to utter a commonplace. Man's removal from the fields of the country to either the gray pavements of the city or the creeping bent of suburbia has made him a stranger to many natural facts and processes.

As has frequently been pointed out this change in our environment has rendered almost unintelligible most of the Biblical imagery and much nature poetry. "The Lord is my shepherd" means little to a person who has never seen a working member of that profession. How many people could recognize Bryant's fringed gentian or know, without a footnote, why Frost bids farewell to his orchard in autumn by admonishing it to stay cool?

Man remains a natural species even though he may be born in an eight hundred-bed hospital, pass most of his life in a fluorescent-lighted, air-conditioned office, and eventually be spirited from view in a funeral home with piped-in organ music. And this natural heritage of man is important to teachers and others who attempt to work with him and for him.

Yet I am continually struck by how many teachers have little or no "feel" for the facts of biological growth and development. This is not to say that they have never encountered these basic principles of living or growing. The prevalence of courses in human growth and development as part of teacher-training programs is ample evidence that they have at least encountered the material. But because they have apparently never worked at first hand with living materials other than children, they are continually surprised by the more obvious examples of how nature works.

The natural phenomena to which I refer are not recondite or obscure. They are such simple matters as the difference in rates of growth among apparently identical seeds, eggs, or embryos of the same group, growing in the same environment. Or there is the persistence of hereditary or instinctual traits in the face of environmental changes. There is no need to call the full roll of these facts, which are said to make all gardeners

philosophers and all bird-watchers poets. They are, however, facts seemingly not familiar to the urban-bred teacher unless he happens to have some hobby that keeps him in touch with growing, living things. Otherwise, only cataclysmic floods or hurricanes seem to remind modern man occasionally that nature is still around us and moving in her own way.

But if the teacher has in fact lost contact with nature, this deprivation has not improved his professional operations. Too often, like the three-year-old who attempts to make his seedlings grow faster by tugging at their tips, teachers seem to forget certain facts about living organisms that are important in school operations. And the educational program sometimes reflects this forgetfulness.

Yet if the teacher has lost touch with nature, he also seems scarcely to be at home with the kind of environment that has replaced nature. One feature of this new environment is certainly the machine. But here the intellectual, and the would-be intellectual, draw back in horror from the machine. It seems as strange and repulsive as the manure heap. Probably this attitude is in part merely a pose that is stylish at the moment, but there must be enough deep-seated feeling to make the pose as popular as it apparently is.

The prevalence of this attitude was brought to my attention in a class of my own this summer. Like most summer classes in departments of education, it was composed almost exclusively of teachers. Because of the size of the class, the method of instruction had to be unmitigated lecture, with few students feeling that they could interpose questions in view of the size of the group. The physical facilities were also bad, making it extremely difficult for students even to see and hear. Consequently, when a colleague in our audio-visual center suggested the use of closed-circuit TV for one of the lectures, I immediately agreed.

Not that I am an enthusiast for teaching by TV or that I am a consistent or even occasional user of mechanical aids. I was eager only to enable the class at least to see and hear better in a difficult and unfortunate situation. As a result, I presented one lecture on closed-circuit TV.

The audio-visual center, as part of its research program, gave the class a questionnaire that produced some extremely interesting results. As was to be expected—and was, in fact, almost inevitable—most students said that they heard and saw better. Since the opportunity to see and hear the material I was presenting was about all the class had to offer, the mechanical device seemed to have been a real educational aid within

these narrow limits. Despite the fact, however, that the vast majority of the class felt that they got more of what there was to get, an equally large majority indicated that they would not want additional lectures to be given in this manner.

Some of them felt impelled to offer rather specious reasons for this shift in opinion. Most of them, however, were prepared to say bluntly that they simply dislike the use of mechanical aids of all sorts. They were afraid that education was becoming "mechanized." An apparent fear and distrust of the machine were quite explicitly stated.

At this point I was inclined to ask how many of them come to Chicago or to the campus on horseback. I also felt (though only momentarily) that I should stop using books since these educational aids too have been contaminated by the typewriter, the linotype, and the rotary press. I was also interested in noting that even those most vehement in their rejection of the machine continued to use the elevator when they visited my office on the fourth floor.

This abhorrence for the machine, at least in the extreme form in which it is currently expressed these days, is simply silly. The machine is obviously here to stay. What is more, it is obviously multiplying more rapidly than many natural species. The job of the teacher, therefore, is to bring himself to, and help his students arrive at, a proper means of living with the machine.

There are, of course, drawbacks, dangers, and just plain flatness and deadness connected with machines. Sex, death, power, destructiveness, and a number of other things are equally threatening and involve the same problems. Yet we must live with all of them, and they all have creative potentialities. The same is true of machines. The problem is to use them intelligently and to cope with the dangers. One can back off into an artsy-craftsy attitude, only to find that the world has moved past—by machine.

I hope that I have taken an exaggerated view of my experiences or that they are not typical. Education is in for a bad time if teachers are actually such strangers in both worlds, be it the world of nature or that of machines.

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Educational Writings

I. B. BERKSON, *The Ideal and the Community: A Philosophy of Education.*
New York 16: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. xii+302. $4.50.

Of the many books on educational philosophy that have appeared in
the past decade, Professor Berkson's contribution is especially welcome
for its originality and common sense. There is a breadth of interest dis-
played here that suggests a quality of mind not commonly found in edu-
cational circles. Because this book is meritorious in important ways, it is
painful to this reviewer to deal with its limitations. However, it is to the
author's credit that the difficulties with which I am confronted are not
trivial.

Professor Berkson takes as the basic categories for his discussion of
educational theory the *ideal* and the *community*. I am sorry to have to
write that his conceptions of both the ideal and the community are not
always clear to me. At times, *ideal* seems to be synonymous with *idea;* in
another context, the term seems to mean a transcendent entity involving
certain religious images that are clearly important to the author; in other
contexts, *ideal* becomes a synonym for value. Finally, I suspect that *ideal*
may mean all things to Professor Berkson.

I do not see why the term *ideal* cannot be understood as implicating
the epistemological, the transcendental or theological, and the realm of
value. "Idealist" philosophers tend to be holistic; certainly Plato was and
very profitably, too. But I have not been successful in understanding how,
for Professor Berkson, an ideal functions as an idea, what ideas are, what
their relation is to the world of sensible experience, and the relation be-
tween ideas, transcendental ideals, and values.

For Plato, the ideal is that in which both intelligible objects and intellect
participate. Consequently, intelligible objects are intelligible, and the
knowing mind can know. The platonic concept of the ideal speaks to a
fundamental philosophic problem: What is knowledge and how is it at-
tained? Of course, there is a good deal more to the Platonic formulation;
the conception of the dialectic is crucial. But I have paraphrased Plato
only to show the kind of statement that can be made on this subject, a kind
of statement that Professor Berkson, I think, has not made.

The book is divided into three parts, "The Revision of Educational
Experimentalism," "The Emerging Democratic Order," and "Profile of an
Educational Policy." Part I consists of an analysis of "progressivism" and
"pragmatism"; of Dewey, Kilpatrick, Peirce, and James. In his criticism

of the "progressivist" interpretation of Dewey, Professor Berkson has made a contribution to the literature of educational philosophy. And his treatment of the philosophers themselves is superior to the treatment they receive in most works in this field.

But there are serious limitations in Professor Berkson's analysis. One limitation that he has permitted himself is the use of such nefarious *isms* as "naturalism," "experimentalism," and even "positivist empiricism"—horrors!—as well as "perennialism" and, indeed, "idealism" itself. The second and related limitation is his tendency to view philosophies as cosmological (or, if you prefer, metaphysical) doctrines rather than as carefully developed sets of terms, each involving unique methodological apparatuses and all of them useful instruments for attacking problems of all sorts.

Professor Berkson writes, "My deviation from the usual experimentalist position involves a change from a biological-social interpretation which emphasizes the process of personal development to a historical-cultural approach which places institutional achievements and the enduring ideals of civilization at the center of consideration" (Preface, p. xi). He goes on to state that his position "is not irreconcilable with the Dewey philosophy." But this business of a "position" or an "interpretation," "approach," and "center of consideration" does not provide him with a rigorously developed set of terms with which to attack his problem. Consequently, he concludes his far better than run-of-the-mill discussion of Dewey with the criticism that Dewey "emphasizes" change without seeing the necessity for fixed beliefs, fixed ends, or fixed values. Yet if Professor Berkson had wanted to pursue the question of the nature of ideals, Dewey provided machinery that Berkson could have used. Professor Berkson addresses himself to Dewey's conception of value, only to vehemently deny it. A denial of the Deweyan ethical theory based on an alternative philosophic position does not particularly disturb me, but, as I understand the text, Professor Berkson's rejection of Dewey's conception of the ethical is based not on a philosophical but rather on a theological position that I do not clearly grasp.

In the main, I have criticized Professor Berkson from a position that he recognizes and is opposed to; hence, I must speak to this point before going to the rest of the book. Berkson writes:

A definition of philosophy in terms only of process and inquiry is inadequate for educational policy. While the idea of a continuous quest must ever remain an element of living philosophies, the search insofar as it is to lead to action in any given society must eventuate in a clearly formulated communally accepted

pattern of beliefs. A philosophy need not lay down the law in specific cases, but it must be definite enough to suggest a policy, it must support convictions on major issues of principle, and, in some instances, involve a commitment to "absolutes" [p. 89].

Earlier in the text, he has put the problem of "absolutes" in terms of "rationalized beliefs":

The experimentalist, echoing the dictum, "not philosophy but philosophizing" defines philosophy primarily as a method of continuous inquiry. But if philosophy is to be of aid in the formulation of educational policy, it must not only raise questions, it must give answers. The philosophic enterprise begins with criticism. But the task of philosophy is not done until it reinstates beliefs—either a rationalized return to old beliefs, a modification of them, or a proposal of new beliefs [p. 61].

Since I have adopted what might be viewed as an "experimentalist" conception of philosophy (I really have Plato's *Seventh Epistle* in mind), I think that I should respond to Professor Berkson's explicit statements about the position. I cannot believe that anyone, least of all Professor Berkson, seriously holds that philosophy is a process of raising questions without the hope of finding answers to those questions. Certainly the end of philosophizing lies beyond the mere asking of questions. Certainly it is not too much to ask that philosophy have practical consequences. (Is this not a definition of ethics?) Certainly there must be a "rationalized return to old beliefs, a modification of them or a proposal of new beliefs." But how am I to understand "a commitment to 'absolutes' "? What does the intellectual examination of values have to do with a commitment to "absolutes"? At this point I begin to worry about whether I know what an "absolute" is.

But what is important here is the distinction between philosophy as method and philosophy as doctrine. Both Professor Berkson and I are being delightfully (I hope!) vague about the relation between these two meanings. We seem to differ in our views on philosophy in that he is very much concerned with the survival of philosophy in the sense of a formulated doctrine of the practical, while I shudder to think of the prospect of blossoms without stems or roots. I shall only say that, following Plato, I dislike settling for opinion in place of knowledge. "Absolutes" about the ethical society can be implanted in men by a variety of means, some of them better than others. Convictions about values or anything else are dangerous when they are not grounded in principle. If the reasoned argument that provides the foundation for a conclusion and thus converts opinion into knowledge is not to be the goal of educators, then I can hardly see

much of a future for either educators or the rest of the human race. I am sure that Professor Berkson would agree with all this. I can only wish that he had dealt with the problem at greater length.

Professor Berkson concludes Part I with a discussion entitled "Ethics and Politics as Basis for a Philosophy of Education." Since a discussion of this short chapter could easily consume the space set aside for this review, I shall have to content myself with sketching some of the problems. His distinction between the ethical and the political is interesting. As I understand it, the latter is equivalent to "the conventional way of life embodied in the existing laws and customs," while the former equals "the ideal way approved by our reason and conscience" (p. 88). The interaction between the ethical and the political produces a tension that is for Berkson the essence of the ethical quest. What is necessary, says Berkson, for the interaction to take place is that "the ideal must be formulated as a firmly held belief" (p. 88).

The "ethical" and "political" are the "ideal" and the "community" that Berkson takes as his basic terms. Part I of the text is intelligible as the rejection of philosophic positions that have no place for ideals, that is, "firmly held beliefs." Part II is a search in the historical-institutional-cultural context of Western civilization for the "firmly held beliefs" necessary for the tension that will make a moral society possible. Clearly, the interaction between ideal and community is fundamental to the entire position.

The difficulty that I find in Professor Berkson's position is precisely due to his lack of interest in the "experimentalist" (or the Platonic!) conception of inquiry. That is, the tension between ideal and actual does not quite come off because neither the ideal nor the actual is treated sufficiently philosophically. The very points that ought to be the most problematical are presented as the most matter of fact.

Consider first the ideal, defined as a set of beliefs. Where does Professor Berkson turn for his ideals? To his analysis of Western civilization, which includes recent and contemporary problems of German and Russian totalitarianism. The ideals are reflected in five statements (which I regret having to chop):

Affirmation of the principles of the Constitution . . .
Renewal of emphasis on the Bill of Rights . . .
Commitment to the unqualified application of the principle of equality . . .
Promotion of a welfare economy . . .
Support of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . [p. 288].

These beliefs are not discovered after an analysis of the nature of passion or the diversity of constitutions or the meaning of justice, of the good, of power, of the state. The beliefs are the conclusions of a study of circumstances, contemporary and historical—a study that does not take into account its own terms of analysis, a study that, however sophisticated (as indeed it is), is of necessity the statement of an historical-cultural *anschauung* rather than a compelling argument. Professor Berkson has acted as if the circumstances of the past (as the source of ideals) as well as the contemporary community are givens immediately available and "ready made to prediction," to use Dewey's words. He has substituted things and events for ideas about things and events so that he might disavow inquiries for the sake of beliefs. Even this substitution would be acceptable if I could be convinced that things are necessarily as they seem to Professor Berkson, but unfortunately I suspect that the circumstances of the past and the present are susceptible of a variety of interpretations.

I do not wish to imply that what I have called the analysis of circumstances, historical and contemporary, is in itself necessarily inferior to an analysis of justice or the good, the topics of the philosopher. It is rather the status of ideals and ideas in Professor Berkson's work that concerns me. When I am asked "to accept the authority of the objective and rational experience of the race in its historical and ecumenical dimension" (p. 223), I can only wonder whose version of the objective and rational experience I shall be subjected to. I have already criticized this assumption of a universe of experience objectively given and immediately accessible to the mind. I wish now only to relate this assumption to a second element, Professor Berkson's conception of the nature of ideas, which is essential to his concern with the historical and the circumstantial. According to the author, an idea is properly understood when it is viewed in the historical-circumstantial-institutional context in which it originated. The genetic approach to ideas or theories may be very useful for certain purposes (though it may be degraded to the status of a logical fallacy), but it is not adequate for all purposes. For handling ideas, it seems to me, it is not the most appropriate technique for a philosopher—particularly an "idealist"—to be caught with. I should think that, for any philosopher, the philosophic techniques he chooses for analysis are crucial. "The dialectic," Plato defines somewhere, "is the clarification of an idea in a mind." (What better definition of education has been proposed?)

It is not surprising that Professor Berkson should have little that is

startling in Part III "Profile of an Educational Policy." Given the ambiguity of the ideal as idea, he is led to call for more emphasis on subject matter (I heartily agree!) and, in particular, for a consideration of the cultural heritage as the source of ideals. But because we are dealing with things rather than inquiries, we have neither principles for the organization of a curriculum nor a conception of a curriculum that deals with principled arguments.

I suppose that the fundamental difference between Professor Berkson and myself is that I still plumb for the "mere" liberation of intelligence (as he characterizes what is for him the inadequate liberalism of the 1920's) as the primary goal of education. For myself, I believe that the social office of education can best be realized through the actualization of potential intellect; any attempt to specify what the individual ought to be committed to in the way of absolutes about the good society seems to me to subordinate the aim of developing a capacity to inquire to the dictates of a doctrine—not of education—but of society.

I hope I have made it clear that *The Ideal and the Community* is a stimulating book.

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